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During the last twenty years, there has been a revolution
in antitrust law. As a result of extensive scholarly and judicial
analysis, a new learning has developed concerning the content,
role, and effect of antitrust doctrines. This trend has focused
primarily on the primacy of consumer welfare and economic ef-
ficiency. Most commentators now assume that these two inter-
related goals are the principal, if not exclusive, concerns of
antitrust law. The United States Supreme Court has responded
to these new approaches by modifying or altering antitrust law
in a long series of cases. Similarly, the new learning has af-
fected the focus of antitrust enforcement by the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
While these changes have occurred in the federal area, the
state law of business torts has moved in a different direction.
Indeed, the interaction between antitrust law and tortious in-
terference doctrines has followed an unusual pattern. The
Sherman Act was enacted in part because many believed that
the common law governing trade practices did not adequately
deter competitive abuses.1 After many years of expansive in-
terpretation, the Supreme Court in the last two decades has
limited the scope of antitrust liability in a manner generally
consistent with the principal goals of competition, efficiency,
and consumer welfare.
The common law of torts, in contrast, has undergone a
rapid doctrinal expansion during the same period.2 The law of
tortious interference has been carried along in this tide of lia-
bility expansion, with considerably less attention given to con-
1. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 278-79 (6th
Cir. 1898) (discussing the Sherman Act's affirmative prohibition of trade re-
straints, creation of new federal criminal and civil remedies, and extension of
illegality beyond common law rules), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, EcoNoMIcs AND FEDERAL ANTrrRUST LAW § 2.4, at 52 & nn.12-13
(1985) (discussing Congress's intent to make common law rules more effective
and citing additional commentary). For an example of a common law case
that failed to address exclusionary practices, see Mogul Steamship Co. v. Mc-
Gregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B. 598, aff'd, 1892 App. Cas. 25, in which the defend-
ants committed no tort despite a horizontal conspiracy and a bitter trade war.
In the 1960s, the heyday of antitrust expansion, one commentator stressed the
availability of antitrust theories and remedies for claims traditionally brought
under the common law of torts. See John H. Boone, Single-Corporation Com-
petitive Torts and the Sherman Act: A Projection Based upon a Review of the
Albert Pick, Atlantic Heel, and Perryton Cases, 2 GA. L. REV. 372, 372-91
(1968).




cerns of efficiency. Plaintiffs with weak antitrust claims have
relied successfully upon various state law theories, principally
tortious interference with contract or prospective business rela-
tions, but also unfair competition and breach of the duties of
good faith and fair dealing. These business tort actions often
apply legal standards different from, if not wholly inconsistent
with, federal antitrust law. Moreover, tortious interference law
suffers from considerable doctrinal confusion, which contrib-
utes to its conflict with antitrust law.
Deauville Corp. v. Federated Department Stores3 illustrates
the tension between antitrust and business tort doctrines.
Deauville and Federated were developing competing shopping
malls in the suburbs of Houston, Texas.4 Montgomery Ward, a
major retailer, sought to become an anchor tenant in a mall in
the same area.5 Ward had discussions with both developers and
signed a joint venture agreement with Deauville under which
Ward would be an anchor tenant if Deauville's mall was built.6
Because Deauville had not yet constructed the mall, Ward
could terminate the agreement at will.7  Federated, with
knowledge of the nascent joint venture, approached Ward and
induced it to become an anchor tenant in a new phase of Feder-
ated's mall.8 Deauville sued, claiming that Federated violated
the antitrust laws against monopolization and restraint of trade
and that it tortiously interfered with Deauville's business rela-
tionship with Ward.9
The Fifth Circuit held Deauville's antitrust claims to be
meritless as a matter of law but remanded the tort claim for
trial.1° The court found the tortious interference claim viable
because Federated's internal memoranda indicated that some
"decision-makers favored offering Ward a store site, not to ad-
vance Federated's legitimate economic interests, but solely to
prevent Ward's going to the [Deauville] site or to block develop-
ment of the [Deauville] site altogether."'" The court noted "a
degree of incongruity... in an opinion striking down the fed-
eral antitrust claims and yet finding evidence of malice neces-
3. 756 F.2d 1183, 1194-96 (5th Cir. 1985).





9. Id- at 1188.
10. Id at 1197.
11. Id- at 1195-96.
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sary to support the state claim of unlawful interference....
[Tihe federal law protects competition; the state law, requiring
no finding regarding market power, protects the competitor."'
12
Deauville illustrates the tendency of tortious interference law
to base liability on the defendant's subjective state of mind,
rather than on the defendant's conduct or the effect on the
market. It also demonstrates the differing role of competition
in antitrust and business tort law.
Part I of this Article briefly examines the analytical frame-
work of antitrust law, which focuses primarily on the objective
effect of a firm's activity on the relevant market. Antitrust law
seeks to penalize behavior that threatens competition, while
permitting free competition on the merits even at the expense
of less efficient competitors. This competitive process should
lead to efficiency and enhance consumer welfare.
Part II of the Article examines the law of tortious interfer-
ence and finds that the business tort approach often conflicts
with now-accepted antitrust reasoning. A party can interfere
with either an existing, valid contract or with a prospective
business relationship. In the case of existing contracts, tort law
gives controlling weight to the interest in contract stability; a
third party who interferes with this type of arrangement is lia-
ble in tort absent a countervailing privilege. Competition is not
a defense. Although this general proposition is not problem-
atic, courts often apply the rule to contracts that are either
voidable or terminable at will. Thus, tort law in this area gives
excessive protection to tenuous contractual relationships at the
expense of competition and efficiency. Further, the availability
of punitive damages for tortious interference with contract may
deter efficient breaches of contract and, thereby, heighten the
doctrinal conflict.
With regard to prospective economic relationships, tort law
recognizes a competition privilege: a bona fide competitor may
vie for potential customers so long as it employs lawful means.
Nonetheless, these firms remain exposed to tort liability be-
cause they must show that they were not motivated by a sub-
jective desire to harm their competitor. This rule often leads to
litigation and may chill legitimate business practices that poten-
tially would benefit consumers.
Finally, Part III of the Article contends that antitrust and
tortious interference law should be harmonized, and it suggests
12. Id at 1196 n.9.
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the revision of business tort standards to reconcile these two
bodies of law. It analyzes rules governing competitors, vertical
relationships, and group behavior in light of the proposed
standards.
I. EFFICIENCY AND COMPETITION IN
ANTITRUST LAW
A. PROTECTING COMPETITION, NOT COMPETITORS
Courts and commentators widely recognize that the anti-
trust laws should serve to promote competition in the market-
place.13  Although some commentators have argued that
antitrust law should also serve to protect small business,'4 in
recent years the Supreme Court has rejected this view. As Jus-
tice Brennan noted in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado,15
"the antitrust laws do not require the courts to protect small
businesses from the loss of profits due to continued competi-
tion, but only against the loss of profits from practices forbid-
den by the antitrust laws." Hence, to the extent that small
businesses fall prey to anticompetitive behavior, the Sherman
and Clayton Acts protect them.16
When the goals of efficiency and protection of small firms
conflict, however, antitrust doctrine gives more weight to effi-
ciency concerns. For example, a manufacturer might end its
contract with one dealer and enter a substitute agreement with
a newly established competing dealer. This transaction poten-
tially increases competition in the market at the dealer level,
albeit to the detriment of the terminated dealer. The antitrust
13. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488
(1977) (" 'The antitrust laws . .. were enacted for the protection of competi-
tion, not competitors."' (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 320 (1962))); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 885
F.2d 683, 691-97 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying the competition principle and over-
turning an antitrust verdict for the plaintiff), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 441 (1990);
1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 103-113 (1978);
RICHARD A. PosNE, ANTrrRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE at ix
(1976).
14. Commentators have identified several goals for antitrust law, includ-
ing the protection of small businesses, general notions of commercial fairness,
and creation of a level playing field for competitors. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP,
supra note 1, § 2.1, at 41-42 (summarizing the debate).
15. 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986).
16. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 (1988); HOVENKAmp, supra note 1, § 2.4 (summarizing the legislative history
of both acts).
1993] 1101
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [
laws do not provide the dealer with a remedy on these facts.17
B. EFFICIENCY AND CONSUMER WELFARE
The antitrust laws seek to promote efficiency and ulti-
mately to benefit consumers by furthering competition in the
marketplace. The Supreme Court's frequently quoted state-
ment in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States'8 illus-
trates the antitrust commitment to this principle:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of eco-
nomic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as
the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained inter-
action of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our eco-
nomic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an envi-
ronment conducive to the preservation of our democratic and social
institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy
unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.
1 9
A firm's competitive behavior, although it may enhance
consumer welfare, can detrimentally effect others in the mar-
ket. The Sherman Act, however, prohibits only exclusionary
practices; vigorous competition is lawful.20 Thus, a firm may
increase its market share and even attain a monopoly as long as
it results from "superior skill, foresight and industry. ' ' 21
The federal courts have established elaborate guidelines re-
garding the types of pricing behavior that contravene the Sher-
man Act and the Robinson-Patman Act. Under these
guidelines, price competition that harms a rival is not in itself
17. See Northwest Power Prods. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83, 91 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979). In a case involving similar facts, a dis-
trict court upheld a jury verdict on a tortious interference claim and over-
turned an antitrust verdict because the plaintiff did not show any harm to
competition or unreasonable restraint of trade. Machine Maintenance &
Equip. Co. v. Cooper Indus., 661 F. Supp. 1112, 1114-19 (E.D. Mo. 1987). See
generally 1 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 111 (arguing that protection
of small business cannot be a major antitrust goal); POSNER, supra note 13, at
4, 19-20 (same).
18. 356 U.S. 1 (1958); see Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979)
("Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription.'"
(quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx 66 (1978))); see also 1
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 103 (analyzing policy choices underlying
the competition principle).
19. 356 U.S. at 4-5.
20. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
n.32 (1985). Exclusionary behavior is "behavior that not only (1) tends to im-
pair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition
on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.'" Id. (quoting 3
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 626b, at 78).
21. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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an antitrust violation. Predatory pricing, for example, is price
cutting designed to drive out a competitor. A firm's unilateral
pricing decisions are lawful unless the price is below cost and
therefore deemed predatory.22 Courts, therefore, generally re-
quire plaintiffs claiming predatory pricing to show that defend-
ants' prices are below some measure of "cost." For instance,
the First Circuit's influential decision in Barry Wright Corp. v.
ITT Grinnell Corp.23 rejected an approach that would allow an
antitrust plaintiff to proceed to trial even if the defendant's
price exceeded average total cost. The court indicated that an
inquiry into the price-cutting firm's subjective motivation for
its acts would unduly chill price competition.24 An intent-based
analysis, the court noted, "offers too vague a standard in a
world where executives may think no further than 'Let's get
more business,' and long-term effects on consumers depend in
large measure on competitors' responses. ' ' 5
The Supreme Court employed an economic analysis in Mat-
sushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.26 The
Court expressed skepticism about predation through price cut-
ting and noted that "predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried
and even more rarely successful."2 7  Allowing implausible
claims to proceed to trial could deter procompetitive conduct.
"[C]utting prices in order to increase business often is the very
essence of competition. Thus, mistaken inferences in cases
such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the
22. Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 883
F.2d 1101, 1110-11 (1st Cir. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
23. 724 F.2d 227, 236 (1st Cir. 1983).
24. Il at 234-35.
25. Id, at 232. The court further observed:
[I]f the search for intent means a search for documents or statements
specifically reciting the likelihood of anticompetitive consequences or
of subsequent opportunities to inflate prices, the knowledgeable firm
will simply refrain from overt description. If it is meant to refer to a
set of objective economic conditions that allow the court to "infer" im-
proper intent .... then, using Occam's razor, we can slice "intent"
away. Thus, most courts now find their standard, not in intent, but in
the relation of the suspect price to the firm's costs.
Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, the antitrust laws permit a firm to reduce
its prices in response to a competitor's lower price, even though the firm does
not offer that lower price to other customers. Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Bev-
erage, 460 U.S. 428, 445 (1983) ("A seller is permitted 'to retain a customer by
realistically meeting in good faith the price offered to that customer, without
necessarily changing the seller's price to its other customers."' (quoting Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 250 (1951))).




very conduct the antitrust laws were designed to protect. '28
Similarly, the antitrust laws do not forbid mergers that will
produce increased economies of scale or other efficiencies un-
less there is evidence that they will reduce competition in the
relevant geographic and product markets. 29 The "true test of
legality," as the Court has noted, "is whether the restraint...
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition.13 0
These cases illustrate a guiding principle of the new anti-
trust learning: a firm will not be condemned for its aggressive
behavior in the marketplace unless that behavior is anticompe-
titive, as measured by objective economic criteria.
C. MARKET POWER AND MARKET EFFECT
The rule of reason, the presumptive mode of antitrust anal-
ysis, focuses on the effect of a restraint on competition in the
marketplace.31 As the Supreme Court recognized in Continen-
tal TV. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,32 "an antitrust policy divorced
from market considerations would lack any objective
benchmarks."
An important issue in any rule of reason inquiry is the
market power of the firm or firms engaging in the alleged re-
straint of trade,33 as this evidence will reflect the restraint's
likely market impact. Market power consists of the power to
28. Id. at 594.
29. 1 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 1 104, at 9 n.4 (citing Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962)).
30. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
691 (1978) (quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918)).
31. See E.W. French & Sons v. General Portland, Inc., 885 F.2d 1392, 1400-
01 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that a § 1 rule of reason claim requires agreement,
intent to restrain competition, and actual injury to competition) (citing NCAA
v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.27 (1984)). The Supreme Court has
stated the rule as follows: "[Tihe inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is
whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one
that suppresses competition." National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S.
at 691.
32. 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977).
33. See National Socy of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 691-92 & n.17;
Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 966-68 (10th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990); Northwest Power Prods. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d
83, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
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control prices or exclude competition.34 Under the rule of rea-
son analysis, a firm's "'evil intent"' to harm a competitor,
although relevant to the market impact of its actions, does not
in itself violate the Sherman Act.35
Courts dispense with market power analysis only when a
restraint is per se illegal under section 1 because the nature of
the violation makes injury to competition extremely likely, as
in the case of a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy. 36 Hence,
"there are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeem-
ing virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. '37
By identifying and uniformly condemning these practices, the
Court provides guidance and reduces the cost of litigation.38
In cases under section 2 of the Sherman Act, plaintiffs
must prove either monopolization or attempted monopoliza-
tion.39 To prove monopolization, a plaintiff must show monop-
oly power in the relevant market;40 to prove attempted
monopolization, a dangerous probability of success in mono-
polizing the market.41 In evaluating a section 2 claim, courts
34. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 n.38; Reazin, 899 F.2d at 966-68 (discussing
market power analysis).
35. Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 756 F.2d 1183, 1192 (5th Cir.
1985) (quoting Northwest Power Prods., 576 F.2d at 90). Some older decisions
permitted liability based on intent to harm under the "Pick-Barth" doctrine.
See Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp., 57 F.2d 96, 103 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 552 (1932).
36. The Court has fashioned per se rules to proscribe practices that are
"manifestly anticompetitive." Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 49-50 (1977); accord Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467
U.S. 752, 768-69 (1984) ("Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticom-
petitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of deci-
sionnaking that competition assumes and demands."); Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 n.25 (1984) (discussing rationale for per se
rules).
37. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
38. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1985).
39. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), provides: "Every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony ...."
40. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (discussing
monopolization elements); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951,
972-73 (10th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990).
41. Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 892 (1993) (requiring evi-
1993] 1105
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
examine the defendant's market share, as well as other indicia
of the defendant's ability or potential to achieve a monopoly.42
Section 2 of the Sherman Act thus constrains the behavior of
dominant firms in defined markets: "[C]onduct is illegal when
taken by a monopolist because it tends to destroy competition,
although in the hands of a smaller market participant it might
be considered harmless, or even 'honestly industrial.' "43 Once
again, there is no liability based solely on the defendant's sub-
jective intent.44
II. THE BUSINESS TORT APPROACH
A fundamental tension exists between antitrust law and
business torts. Antitrust law focuses on allowing competitive
free reign and preventing agreements that restrain competition.
Much of business tort law, however, involves legal restraints on
competition. Although commentators have recognized the ten-
sion between patent, which grants legal monopolies on inven-
tions, and antitrust,45 the tension between antitrust and the
broader field of business tort has received little attention.46
dence of sufficient power in the relevant market to establish a dangerous
probability of success); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline
Co., 885 F.2d 683, 693 (10th Cir. 1989) (discussing attempted monopolization el-
ements), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 972 (1990).
42. Colorado Interstate, 885 F.2d at 693-97 (evaluating market share and
other evidence and concluding that the evidence did not support a claim of at-
tempted monopolization).
43. Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979)
(quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir.
1945)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
44. Spectrum Sports, 113 S. Ct. at 890-92 (holding that evidence of an-
ticompetitive intent and conduct is insufficient to show a violation of § 2, ab-
sent evidence of market power); Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 756
F.2d 1183, 1190 (5th Cir. 1985) ("This court has given little weight to subjective
intent when confronted with the absence, as a matter of economic reality, of
the power to monopolize.").
45. See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 704-709; HOVENKAMP,
supra note 1, § 5.6, at 156-57; Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection:
A Reappraisal, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1813 (1984).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 cmt. f (1977) (briefly not-
ing the interplay between tortious interference and antitrust); Harvey I. Safer-
stein, The Ascendancy of Business Tort Claims in Antitrust Practice, 59
ANTITRUST L.J. 379, 379 (1991) (noting increased use of business tort claims).
One court decision acknowledged the conflict between antitrust and state un-
fair competition law. See Northwest Power Prods. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d
83, 88 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979). Professor (now Dean)
Harvey Perlman has carefully analyzed the tension between business tort and
contract law. See Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other
Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L.
1106 [Vol. 77:1097
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The term "business tort" describes a wide array of tort-
based claims asserted in the context of disputes between com-
petitors, customers, or parties in vertical relationships. The
most common claims are for tortious interference with contract
or with prospective business relationships. Other significant
claims involve unfair competition, breaches of duties of good
faith and fair dealing, and violations of so-called "little FTC
Acts."47
To assess the interplay between tortious interference and
antitrust, it is necessary to analyze the elements and doctrinal
underpinnings of this tort. The law of tortious interference,
like antitrust, recognizes that competition and efficiency are
significant social values. In recent decades, however, antitrust
law has focused greater attention on the importance of competi-
tion, while business tort law has expanded with less direct con-
sideration of these economic issues. A comparison of these two
fields of law demonstrates the extent of this divergence.
A. ToRTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
1. Defining the Tort
The tort of interference with contract involves intentional
and improper interference with another's contract rights. The
interference must proximately cause some type of harm by, for
example, preventing performance, making it more costly to
carry out the terms of the contract, or making performance less
valuable.48 The leading modern case of Lumley v. Gye49 ex-
REv. 61, 61-62 (1982). Finally, Professors Areeda and Turner note that plain-
tiffs may bring both tort and antitrust claims, but they do not comment on the
validity or justification for the tort claims. See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra
note 13, 737, at 276-78, 285-86.
47. See, e.g., E.W. French & Sons v. General Portland, Inc., 885 F.2d 1392,
1394 (9th Cir. 1989) (state antitrust and unfair competition claims); Colorado
Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 885 F.2d 683, 688-90 (10th Cir.
1989) (breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 441 (1990); Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 496 P.2d 817, 828 (Cal.
1972) (breach of Cal. Civil Code § 3369 prohibiting unfair competition). These
claims are beyond the scope of this Article, although they present difficulties
similar to those in tortious interference law.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. k (1977); W. PAGE KEE-
TON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 991 (5th ed.
1984). This tort can be traced to early Roman laws that allowed the pater
familias (head of the household) to recover for harm to members of his family
and servants. Francis B. Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARv. L. REV.
663, 663 (1923). Professor Dan Dobbs notes the later history of "considerable
and apparently irresistible expansion of liability from a rather small nub.
That nub was a repressive scheme of compulsory labor imposed by the feudal
1993] 1107
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tended liability dramatically. In that case, an English court
found the manager of an opera company liable for inducing Jo-
hanna Wagner, a noted opera singer, into breaching her exclu-
sive performance contract with the plaintiff's opera company.50
Lumley is significant because it allowed recovery without
any showing of improper means or independently tortious con-
duct towards Wagner, the party induced to breach the contract,
or towards Lumley, the plaintiff.5  After Lumley, courts
needed to determine when interference with a contractual rela-
tionship, either existing or nascent, was permissible and when
it was tortious. Commentators, such as Professor Dan Dobbs,
view Lumley as having created nearly absolute property rights
in contract expectancies.52
The tort of interference with contract is now widely recog-
nized and accepted. Indeed, Louisiana is the only state that re-
fuses to recognize the tort in its entirety.53 Commentators have
discussed the subject extensively.5 The Restatement (Second)
powers of the 14th century to cope with a terrible labor shortage that followed
the plague." Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relation-
ships, 34 ARK. L. REV. 335, 336 (1980).
49. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
50. Id. at 752-53.
51. Id Interestingly, the contract that Wagner breached was arguably an-
ticompetitive in light of its exclusive dealing provision.
52. See Dobbs, supra note 48, at 350-56 (criticizing property-like aspects of
tortious interference law); Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Rela-
tions in the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property, Contrac
and Tort, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1510, 1511, 1522-28 (1980) (giving a historical over-
view of tortious interference law and arguing that the law has often treated
contractual expectancies as if they were absolute property rights).
53. See Moss v. Guarisco, 409 So. 2d 323, 330-31 (La. Ct. App. 1981), writ
denied, 412 So. 2d 540 (La. 1982) (holding that Louisiana law does not recog-
nize interference with contract as an independent tort); Robert Heard Hale,
Inc. v. Gaiennie, 102 So. 2d 324, 326 (La. Ct. App. 1958) (same). Although Lou-
isiana recently recognized a claim when a corporate officer interfered with the
corporation's contract with the plaintiff, see 9 to 5 Fashions v. Spurney, 538 So.
2d 228, 234 (La. 1989), that ruling has been interpreted to be limited to its
facts, see Matrix Essential v. Emporium Drug Mart, 756 F. Supp. 280, 284
(W.D. La. 1991).
54. See, e.g., 2 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES §§ 9.01-.20 (4th ed. 1982); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 48, § 129; 1 HARRY D. Nnms, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND
TRADEMARKS §§ 162-184 (1947); Dobbs, supra note 48, at 335-76; Fowler V.
Harper, Interference with Contractual Relations, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 873 (1953);
Perlman, supra note 46, at 63-129; Sayre, supra note 48, at 663-703. For an eco-
nomic analysis of the role of the tort, see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw 223-25 (1987). For discus-
sion of tortious interference claims involving professional relationships, see
Phoebe Carter, Annotation, Liability in Tort for Interference with Attorney-
1108 [Vol. 77:1097
of Torts defines the tort as follows:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the per-
formance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another
and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person
not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the
pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third per-
son to perform the contract.55
This Article explores the line of cases in which the tortious
interference involves no independent wrongful action. Cases
involving physical violence, bribery, or other independently il-
legal acts are therefore inapposite, although they also can be
framed as tortious interference claims. 56 The following discus-
sion focuses on liability based solely on a showing of "im-
proper" interference.
2. Ambiguities in the Tort Liability Standard
The central drawback of interference with contract relates
to its focus on the element of improper purpose or wrongful in-
tent. Several commentators argue that the wrongful intent ele-
ment is too flexible. For example, Prosser and Keeton note
that actual spite or malice is not required, "leaving a rather
broad and undefined tort in which no specific conduct is pro-
scribed and in which liability turns on the purpose for which
the defendant acts, with the indistinct notion that the purposes
Client Relationship, 90 A.L.R.4TH 621 (1991); Wanda E. Wakefield, Annotation,
Liability in Tort for Interference with Physician's Contract or Relationship
with Hospital, 7 A.L.R.4TH 572 (1981); Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Rights
of Attorneys Leaving Firm with Respect to Firm Clients, 1 A.L.R.4TH 1164
(1980); and H.J. Alperin, Annotation, Liability in Tort for Interference with
Attorney-Client or Physician-Patient Relationship, 26 A.L.R.3D 679 (1969).
For discussion of the limitations period in tortious interference cases, see Mau-
rice T. Brunner, Annotation, What Statute of Limitations Governs Action for
Interference with Contract or Other Economic Relations, 58 A.L.R.3D 1027
(1974).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977). The defendant can
also be liable for interfering with the plaintiff's ability to perform its obliga-
tions under a contract. Id § 766A.
56. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 129, at 982, 992. The
Restatement does not require an improper act to impose liability: "The inter-
ference is often by inducement. The inducement may be any conduct convey-
ing to the third person the actor's desire to influence him not to deal with the
other. Thus it may be a simple request or persuasion exerting only moral
pressure." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. k (1977). Still, nu-
merous cases have involved allegations of independent wrongful acts. See, e.g.,
Redies v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 711 F. Supp. 570, 573-74 (D. Colo. 1989) (al-
leging interference through fraudulent misrepresentations); Lekich v. IBM




must be considered improper in some undefined way."57 Pro-
fessor Francis Bowes Sayre, in a seminal article, observed that
"where the doctrine has been accepted, there has been so little
careful inquiry as to its precise limits and fundamental nature
that a somewhat uncertain law has resulted."58  Professor
Dobbs argues that the problem with the tort "lies in the com-
plete absence of any principle that will explain to us what judg-
ments to make and why it is that liability sometimes is and
sometimes is not imposed." 59  Another commentator has ob-
served that tortious interference law is "[o]ne of the most fluid
and rapidly growing tort theories. °6 0 As the commentary indi-
cates, tortious interference law is troubling because it is ex-
panding despite its lack of clear principles or doctrinal
foundations.
In an attempt to distinguish legitimate competition and tor-
tious interference, courts define the intent element in a variety
of ways.61 A common approach requires the plaintiff to show
merely that the defendant intended the interference, shifting
the burden of proof to the defendant to establish some "justifi-
cation" for the interference. 62 Defendants often attempt to jus-
tify the interference as protection of the defendants' own
contract or property rights.63 Shifting the burden, however,
forces defendants to justify their actions amidst great uncer-
tainty, given the lack of guidance regarding business
justifications.64
The Restatement appears to take a better approach, argua-
57. KEETON Er AL., supra note 48, § 129, at 979 (footnotes omitted).
58. Sayre, supra note 48, at 672. Similarly, Professor Perlman notes that
"doctrinal confusion is pervasive, both within and among jurisdictions." Perl-
man, supra note 46, at 64.
59. Dobbs, supra note 48, at 346.
60. Jeffrey C. Estes, Expanding Horizons in the Law of Torts-Tortious
Interference, 23 DRAKE L. REv. 341, 341 (1974).
61. Some early cases alluded to "malicious" action, but this term did not
mean ill-will or spite. KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 129, at 983. For discus-
sions of different interpretations of the malice element, see 1 NIMs, supra note
54, § 163; Perlman, supra note 46, at 94.
62. 2 CALLMANN, supra note 54, § 9.02; KEETON ET AL., supra note 48,
§ 129, at 983. Most acts of interference will be intentional, although some will
only be negligent and thus generally not actionable. The real issue is usually
whether the interference is permissible or unlawful.
63. KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 129, at 983. See generally James M.
King & Assoc. v. G.D. Van Wagenen Co., 717 F. Supp. 667, 680-81 (D. Minn.
1989) (discussing justification based on financial interest).
64. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Aurora Air Service, 604 P.2d 1090,
1092-96 (Alaska 1979), illustrates the uncertainties inherent in this defense. In
Alyeska, the court held that the question whether the defendant's interference
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bly requiring the plaintiff to prove not only that the interfer-
ence was intentional or knowing, but also that the defendant
used either improper means or had an improper purpose.
65
The Restatement view sets forth seven factors to be weighed in
determining when the defendant has acted improperly. These
factors are: the nature of the conduct, the defendant's motive,
the plaintiff's interest that was harmed, the interests advanced
by the defendant, the competing "social interests" in protecting
both the plaintiff's expectations under the contract and the de-
fendant's freedom to interfere, the proximity between the de-
fendant's conduct and the resulting interference, and the
relationship between the parties. 66
Although this framework helpfully delineates the relevant
criteria, it nonetheless permits liability based on a vague and
subjective standard. The comments to the Restatement high-
light the importance of the intent factor.67 The comments also
indicate, however, that the defendant need not intend to bring
about the interference, so long as the defendant knows that the
interference is likely to occur as a result of its actions. 68 Fur-
was motivated by legitimate economic and safety concerns, or by desire to
harm, was for the jury to decide. Id. at 1094.
65. The Restatement does not expressly allocate to the plaintiff or defend-
ant the burden of proving improper means or purpose. Cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766, 767 (1977). The comments note that "there is little
consensus on who has the burden of raising the issue of whether the interfer-
ence was improper or not and subsequently of proving that issue . . . ." Id
§ 767 cmt. k. The comments also indicate, however, that courts often require
the plaintiff to plead and prove lack of justification in interference with con-
tract cases, and they recommend that the plaintiff take care to allege improper
interference in the complaint. See id. cmt. b. Prosser and Keeton note that
the Restatement can be read to put the burden on the plaintiff to show impro-
priety as a part of its prima facie case, and they argue that such a reading is
preferable. KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 129, at 983-84.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1977).
67. "The rule stated in this Section is applicable if the actor acts for the
primary purpose of interfering with the performance of the contract .... even
though he acts for some other purpose in addition." Id. § 766 cmt. j (emphasis
added); see also id. cmt. r ("[Tihe freedom to act in the manner stated in this
Section may depend in large measure on the purposes of [the actor's] con-
duct."); id. § 767 cmt. d (noting that intent to interfere is significant if it is the
primary motivation or even if it is a "casual" motive).
68. Comment j to § 776 of the Restatement states:
The rule... applies also to intentional interference ... in which the
actor does not act for the purpose of interfering with the contract...
[] but knows that the interference is certain or substantially certain
to occur as a result of his action. The rule applies, in other words, to
an interference that is incidental to the actor's independent purpose




ther, because the Restatement analysis involves a balancing of
seven specific factors, it requires a case-by-case inquiry, with
few definite rules.69
The Restatement is also ambiguous regarding the issue of
burden of proof. The language of the Restatement appears to
require the plaintiff to prove, as part of its prima facie case,
that the defendant's interference was improper.70 The com-
ments, however, indicate that this burden-of-proof issue is un-
resolved and should depend on state law.7 1 The preferable
approach requires the plaintiff to establish as a part of its prima
facie case that the alleged interference was improper. Placing
the burden on the plaintiff strikes a better balance between
competing interests by giving proper weight to the defendant's
freedom of action in the marketplace.
Moreover, a competitor cannot generally defend against a
tortious interference claim by asserting that the interference
was merely an attempt to compete for business. Although the
Restatement recognizes a competition justification for interfer-
ence with prospective business relationships and with at-will
contracts, it specifically rejects this argument for interference
with an existing contract.72 Apparently, the Restatement gives
the plaintiff's interest in contract stability priority over both
the defendant's interest in competition and the other con-
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 776 cmt. j (1977). Negligence normally is
not a basis for tortious interference liability. See Harper, supra note 54, at 884-
93. But see John C. Smith, Note, Negligent Interference with Contrack"
Knowledge as a Standard for Recovery, 63 VA. L. REV. 813 (1977) (noting that
some modern courts have allowed an action for negligent interference).
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. b (1977) (stating that
each case depends upon an individualized weighing of values).
70. See id. §§ 766, 767.
71. See id. § 767 cmts. b, k. Prosser and Keeton interpret the main text of
the Restatement as placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff, as have several
courts. KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 129, at 983-84. But see Ocean State
Physicians Health Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 883 F.2d 1101, 1113 (1st
Cir. 1989) (holding that under Rhode Island law, the defendant has the burden
of proving justification), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990). For an excellent
analysis demonstrating that the plaintiff should prove as a part of its prima
facie case that the alleged interference was improper, see Top Service Body
Shop v. Allstate Insurance Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1369-71 (Or. 1978).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768(2) (1977). The comments in-
dicate that "an existing contract, if not terminable at will, involves established
interests that are not subject to interference on the basis of competition
alone." Id. cmt. a. The reasoning behind this rule is that "the social interest
in the security of transactions and the greater definiteness of [the plaintiff's]
expectancy outweigh the interests in [the defendant's] freedom of action in
this situation." Id. cmt. h.
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tracting party's interest in striking a better deal and paying
contract damages. The Restatement is not clear on this issue,
however, because the comments indicate that, despite the ab-
sence of a specific competition privilege in cases involving ex-
isting contracts, the defendant may nonetheless prevail under
the general seven-factor test for improper interference.7 3 As
one court noted, the analysis in this area involves some "uncer-
tainty" and "ambivalence." 74
Finally, the "malice" element that some courts employ of-
fers little guidance in determining liability. Under Illinois law,
for example, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant
acted with actual malice, defined as "a desire to harm which
was unrelated to the interest he was presumably seeking to
protect by bringing about the contract breach. ' 75 Although the
Restatement notes that ill will is not necessary for liability, it
indicates that the defendant probably acted without justifica-
tion if it acted with ill will toward the plaintiff.7 6 Hence, mal-
ice, as used in tortious interference law, generally means only
that the interference was intentional or unjustified or both.
Accordingly, the malice element adds nothing to the analysis of
whether an interference should be lawful.
3. The Special Case of the At-Will Contract
A particularly difficult line of cases involves interference
with contracts that are terminable at will. The Restatement
permits liability in these cases on the ground that the at-will
agreement still involves a "valid and subsisting" contract,
although the at-will nature of a contract is relevant in assessing
damages and defenses. 77 Most courts agree that the plaintiff
73. Id. §767cmts. h,k.
74. Ramirez v. Selles, 784 P.2d 433, 435 (Or. 1989) (en banc).
75. Capital Options Invs. v. Goldberg Bros. Commodities, 958 F.2d 186, 189
(7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Langer v. Becker, 531 N.E.2d 830, 834 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988)); accord Warde v. Kaiser, 887 F.2d 97, 101 (6th Cir. 1989) (requiring mali-
ciousness under Tennessee law); International Union, UMWA v. Eastover Min-
eral Co., 623 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (W.D. Va. 1985) (stating that "malicious
interference law does not require proof that the defendant acted with ill will
or spite, but only that the interference was intentional and unjustified");
Candalaus Chicago, Inc. v. Evans Mill Supply Co., 366 N.E.2d 319, 327 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1977) (stating that conduct motivated by spite or ill will is not privileged).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. r (1977). The Restate-
ment further indicates that those decisions that use the term "malice" actually
mean "intentional interference without justification," including acts motivated
by malice or ill will. Id. cmt. s. For an excellent discussion of the malice ele-
ment, see Sayre, supra note 48, at 672-86.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. g (1977). Courts have
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can state a claim based on an at-will contract, despite the con-
tracting parties' ability to opt out of their agreement at any
time and for any reason.78 For example, in Deauville Corp. v.
Federated Department Stores,79 the Fifth Circuit held that,
under Texas law, a competitor can be liable for tortious inter-
ference with the at-will contract of a competing firm. The ra-
tionale supporting this conclusion, according to a New Jersey
court, is that "It]he right to terminate a contract at will is one
which is peculiarly personal to the contracting parties, and a
stranger to the contract may not exercise his will in substitu-
tion for the will of either of the parties to the contract."' 0 This
justification seems questionable, given that the stranger to the
contract was able to persuade one of the contracting parties,
who presumably could exercise its will to opt out of the agree-
ment as it was entitled to do under the law.
In Ahern v. Boeing Co.,81 the plaintiffs sued Boeing for in-
terference with an at-will contract involving an incinerator de-
vice. Applying Florida law, the district court granted summary
judgment for Boeing on the ground that a competitor's good
faith attempt to obtain business permits interference with an
at-will contract.8 2 The court stated that when "part of defend-
expressed a similar rationale for protecting at-will contracts. See, e.g., Smith v.
Ford Motor Co., 221 S.E.2d 282, 290 (N.C. 1976) ("The wrong for which the
courts may give redress includes also the procurement of the termination of a
contract which otherwise would have continued in effect."). The Restatement
does, however, allow a competition defense in cases of interference with at-
will contracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768(1) & cmt. i (1977).
78. See, e.g., DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 887
F.2d 1499, 1518 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Interference with the plaintiff's relationships
with its customers, suppliers, or representatives may be actionable even
though such relationships may be terminable at will."), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1081 (1990); Warde, 887 F.2d at 102 ("[Ihe weight of authority holds that
wrongful interference with contracts terminable at will is actionable."); Kem-
per v. Worcester, 435 N.E.2d 827, 830 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (stating that interfer-
ence with an employment relationship gives rise to a cause of action); Lewis v.
Oregon Beauty Supply Co., 733 P.2d 430, 433 (Or. 1987) ("The parties to an at-
will employment relationship have no less of an interest in the integrity and
security of their contract than do any other contracting parties."); Bocook Out-
door Media v. Summey Outdoor Advertising, 363 S.E.2d 390, 394-95 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that terminable-at-will oral contracts may give rise to a
cause of action); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 129, at 995-96 (dis-
cussing cases).
79. 756 F.2d 1183, 1194-96 (5th Cir. 1985); see supra notes 3-12 and accom-
panying text (discussing Deauville in further detail).
80. Wear-Ever Aluminum v. Townecraft Indus., 182 A.2d 387, 393-94 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1962).
81. 539 F. Supp. 1210 (M.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd, 701 F.2d 142 (11th Cir. 1983).
82. Id, at 1213.
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ant's motivation for interfering with [an at-will] contract [is] to
advance defendant's business interests, the interference is privi-
leged as competition and is therefore justified as a matter of
law."813 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the lower
court had misstated Florida law and that the plaintiffs were en-
titled to a jury trial on their claim.8 4 In the circuit court's view,
Florida's competition privilege protects only "mere self inter-
ested and competitive solicitation," and the plaintiffs suffi-
ciently alleged that Boeing exceeded such mere solicitation.8 5
In another case, Chanay v. Chittenden,8 6 the plaintiff, an
insurance broker, sued defendant Chittenden, a vice president
of the Union Mutual Insurance Company, for tortious interfer-
ence with the plaintiff's at-will contract with the insurance
company.8 7 The plaintiff claimed that Chittenden's action in
persuading the company to make him its exclusive Arizona
agent displaced the plaintiff and other independent brokers,
causing the company to terminate its contract with the plain-
tiff, albeit after giving the required fifteen days notice.88 The
Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the
defendants' motions for summary judgment, rejecting Chit-
tenden's competition privilege because of his status as an em-
ployee, rather than a competitor, of the insurance company.8 9
As an alternative ground for its decision, the court held that
competitors do not have a free hand maliciously (meaning in-
tentionally and without justification or excuse) to interfere
with established contracts.9° Finally, the court remanded the
case to the trial court to determine whether the defendants
could offer any other justification for the interference.91
83. Id. The district court and the appellate panel noted that there was no
evidence that Boeing harbored, or was motivated by, any il will towards the
plaintiffs. Ahern v. Boeing Co., 701 F.2d 142, 144 (11th Cir. 1983).
84. 701 F.2d at 145.
85. Id
86. 563 P.2d 287 (Ariz. 1977).
87. Ia at 291.
88. Id at 291-92. The broker also sued the company on a respondeat supe-
rior theory. The application of respondeat superior in this case evades the
general rule that a party to a contract cannot be liable for interference with its
own contract. In this regard, Chanay is inconsistent with other cases. See 2
CAL2LMANN, supra note 54, § 9.01, at 3-4 & nn.27-32; Perlman, supra note 46, at
119-23 (discussing liability of corporations and their officers).
89. 536 P.2d at 292. The court apparently did not consider that Chit-
tenden sought to enter the market as an insurance agent and, thus, was at
least a potential competitor.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 292-93. A similar case is Pino v. Prudential Insurance Co., 689 F.
1993] 1115
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Commentators have criticized this line of decisions.92
Sayre, for example, notes that when a party terminates an at-
will contract, there is no breach; hence, the inducing party has
not induced a breach of contract.9 3 A few courts, in fact, have
rejected the majority rule and thus denied blanket protection
for at-will contracts. 94 Moreover, several courts have recog-
nized that interference with an at-will contract should not be
actionable if the defendant did not employ improper means and
had some legitimate business purpose.9 5 Even the Restatement
acknowledges that a competitor might be entitled to encourage
cessation of a contract that is terminable at will.9 6
4. The Voidable Contract
A related line of cases deals with voidable contracts. Ac-
cording to the Restatement, a defendant can be liable for tor-
tious interference even though the underlying contract is
voidable, because "the contract is a valid and subsisting rela-
tion.' '97 This rule is disturbing, because the party induced into
Supp. 1358 (E.D. Pa. 1988), in which the district court refused to grant sum-
mary judgment to a competing insurance company because the competition
privilege is not absolute and does not apply to party that does not sell insur-
ance. Id at 1362-63.
92. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 129, at 995-96 & n.82; see also
Sayre, supra note 48, at 701-02 (arguing that at-will contracts should not give
rise to an action for interference).
93. Sayre, supra note 48, at 701-02; accord Harper, supra note 54, at 878.
94. KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 129, at 995 & nn.80-81. See generally
Frandsen v. Jensen-Sundquist Agency, 802 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1986) (Pos-
ner, J.) ("In cases where no breach of contract results from the interference,
the tort is really a branch of the law of unfair competition, and it is necessary
for liability that the alleged tortfeasor have gone beyond the accepted norms
of fair competition.").
95. Warde v. Kaiser, 887 F.2d 97, 102 (6th Cir. 1989) (recognizing privilege
of competition under Tennessee law when contract is at will); Perez v. Rivero,
534 So. 2d 914, 916 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam) (recognizing competi-
tion privilege to interfere with at-will contracts); see also Galinski v. Kessler,
480 N.E.2d 1176, 1182-83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (stating that contract terminable at
will deserves less protection than other contracts); KEETON ET AL., supra note
48, § 129, at 996 & n.87 (stating that at-will contracts usually are not protected
where interference is not improper and based on a legitimate business pur-
pose); James 0. Pearson, Annotation, Liability for Interference with At Will
Business Relationship, 5 A.L.R.4TH 9, § 9(b) (1981) (discussing cases holding
interference justified when based upon the right to engage in free
competition).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. g, § 768 cmt. i (1977).
97. Id. § 766 cmt. f; see also 2 CALLMANN, supra note 54, § 9.10 (citing
cases in which a technically defective contract was nevertheless protected
against tortious interference); Harper, supra note 54, at 879 (same); James 0.
Pearson, Annotation, Liability for Interference with Invalid or Unenforceable
1116 [Vol. 77:1097
ANTITRUST
non-performance has a complete defense, entitling it to avoid
the contract on grounds such as unconscionability, indefinite-
ness, lack of mutuality, failure of a condition precedent, and the
statute of frauds.9 8 The rule also is inconsistent with the treat-
ment of contracts that are illegal or contrary to public policy;
interference with these contractual relationships is not
actionable.99
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.100 is probably the most famous
case to address this issue. The litigation concerned a battle be-
tween oil giants Texaco and Pennzoil for control of Getty Oil
Company. Getty had signed an "agreement in principle"-es-
sentially an unenforceable agreement to agree-to merge with
Pennzoil, but Texaco later presented Getty with a better of-
fer.101 When the Pennzoil/Getty merger collapsed, Pennzoil
sued Texaco, claiming tortious interference with its "agree-
ment."' 0 2 The case is notorious partly because of the size of the
jury's verdict for Pennzoil: over ten billion dollars, including
three billion dollars in punitive damages. 0 3 The Texaco v.
Pennzoil court did not take into account the tentative nature of
the relationship between Pennzoil and Getty, but instead pro-
tected it as if it were a binding, unalterable contract.
Competition should be a central consideration in assessing
tortious interference claims involving contracts that are not
valid and fully enforceable. As Rudolf Callmann notes, tor-
tious interference law permits interference "only when the ac-
tor seeks to protect an interest of greater social value than that
Contract, 96 A.L.R.3D 1294, 1301-04, 1309-10 (1979) (same). But see id. at 1298-
301, 1310-14 (citing cases finding no liability where the underlying contract was
voidable).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. f (1977).
99. Id. § 774 ("One who by appropriate means causes the nonperformance
of an illegal agreement or an agreement having a purpose or effect in violation
of an established public policy is not liable for pecuniary harm resulting from
the nonperformance.").
100. 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert dismissed, 485 U.S. 994
(1988).
101. Id. at 786.
102. Id. at 784.
103. Id. For a well-reasoned critique and discussion of the case, see
Timothy S. Feltham, Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations:
The Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. Litigation, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 111, 143-44
(1988), which concludes that the Texas decision improperly gave full protec-
tion to an agreement in principle. The litigation is also well known because of
Texaco's unsuccessful attempt to obtain federal intervention in support of re-
lief from the Texas state court's judgment. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
481 U.S. 1, 10-18 (1987) (holding the Younger abstention doctrine bars federal
intervention in on-going state proceedings).
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which attaches to the sanctity of the contract involved."104 The
social benefit arising from enforcement and continuation of
voidable and at-will contracts is necessarily smaller than the
benefit from the enforcement of valid contracts of definite
duration.
5. Tort Damages
A final area of tension is damages. Most courts allow re-
covery of the full range of tort damages, including punitive
damages, such as those awarded in Texaco v. Pennzoil.05
These decisions generally draw an analogy to other intentional
torts and conclude that the plaintiff's recovery should not be
limited to contract damages or even to full compensatory dam-
ages.10 6 In many cases, courts have upheld jury awards of puni-
tive damages that greatly exceeded actual damages.107 For
104. 2 CALLMANN, supra note 54, § 9.01, at 3.
105. KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 129, at 1003-04; see, e.g., Machine
Maintenance & Equip. Co. v. Cooper Indus., 661 F. Supp. 1112, 1114-19 (E.D.
Mo. 1987) (upholding jury award of almost two million dollars in compensa-
tory damages and reducing punitive damage award from ten million dollars to
$100,000). See generally 2 CALLMANN, supra note 54, § 9.20 (discussing the
measure of damages in interference cases); Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Re-
covery Based on Tortfeasor's Profits in Action for Procuring Breach of Con-
tract, 5 A.L.R.4TH 1276 (1981) (discussing whether a court may consider the
tortfeasor's profit from interfering with the contract in calculating damages).
If the plaintiff has recovered damages for the underlying breach of con-
tract, the court deducts that amount from any recovery in tort. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. v (1977). Except for this set-off of damages, the
ability of the plaintiff to sue for breach of contract does not impair its ability
to sue for tortious interference. Id
Tennessee provides by statute that plaintiffs may recover treble damages
for tortious interference. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-50-109 (1988). It nonetheless
recognizes the extreme nature of this remedy and thus limits its availability to
clear cases. Warde v. Kaiser, 887 F.2d 97, 101 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying Tennes-
see law).
106. KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 129, at 1003-04.
107. E.g., Gregg v. U.S. Indus., 887 F.2d 1462, 1472, 1475-77 (11th Cir. 1989)
($43,050 actual damages and two million dollars punitive damages, reduced by
trial court from jury award of $18.5 million punitive damages); Cross v. Ameri-
can Country Ins. Co., 875 F.2d 625, 627, 631-32 (7th Cir. 1989) ($216 in actual
damages and $15,000 in punitive damages); Boyer v. Grandview Manor Care
Ctr., 805 S.W.2d 187, 188, 191-92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding award of $340
in actual damages and reducing punitive damage award from $330,000 to
$100,000); United Labs. v. Kuykendall, 403 S.E.2d 104, 107 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)
(one dollar in nominal damages and $100,000 in punitive damages); Collins Mu-
sic Co. v. Terry, 400 S.E.2d 783, 784 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding judge's
award of $100,000 in punitive damages, despite actual damages of only $18,000
in tort claim).
Antitrust commentators occasionally fail to note the potential for higher
recoveries under tort as opposed to antitrust theories. See, e.g., 3 AREEDA &
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example, in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal,1 08 af-
ter a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the trial court gave the win-
ning party two options: either an antitrust award of $153,438 in
treble damages and $212,500 in attorneys' fees, or a tortious in-
terference award of approximately fifty thousand dollars in
compensatory and six million in punitive damages.1 0 9
These cases are inconsistent with the concept of efficient
breach. An efficient breach occurs when the breaching party
can pay full contract damages and still be better off because the
gains from breaching exceed the damages.11 0 In the words of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, "[tihe duty to keep a contract at com-
mon law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you
do not keep it-and nothing else."111
Full tort liability for inducing an efficient breach can dis-
courage the breach from taking place, as Dobbs and Perlman
have noted.1 ' 2 Exacting such a heavy penalty for inducing a
breach of contract seems unreasonable unless every breach is
viewed as undesirable. This has never been the law, and it cer-
tainly is inconsistent with most economic analysis on the sub-
TURNER, supra note 13, % 737(b) ("Antitrust damages are larger [than those in
tort] and thus provide a greater incentive to sue.").
108. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
109. 1&L at 262. The case ultimately went to the Supreme Court on the is-
sue of whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines
applied to private litigation. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment does
not limit an award of damages in a civil action when the government neither
prosecutes the action nor is entitled to any damages. I&i at 263-64.
110. RIcHARD A. PosNER, ECONoMc ANALYSIS OF LAw § 4.8, at 118-20 (4th
ed. 1992); see also Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., 841 F.2d 742, 750-51 (7th Cir.
1988) (Posner, J.) (discussing the effect of remedy on efficient breach).
111. OLIVER W. HoLMES, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 462
(1897).
112. See Dobbs, supra note 48, at 360-61 (noting that efficient breach argu-
ment weighs against allowing tort liability in at least some cases); Perlman,
supra note 46, at 79-87 (discussing relationship between tortious interference
and efficient breach).
For example, if the defendant can increase its profits by $150,000 by induc-
ing the breach and the plaintiff suffers a $75,000 loss as a result, the breach is
efficient. Indeed, the defendant could pay $75,000 in damages and still be bet-
ter off. If a court required the defendant to pay an additional $100,000 in puni-
tive damages for intentionally inducing the breach, however, the defendant
would be deterred from inducing the breach. The result is a loss of $75,000 in
value that would have been created if the breach had occurred. The numbers
in this example are drawn from a discussion of efficient breach in Patton, 841
F.2d at 750-51. The conclusion that the breach is efficient factors in no addi-
tional value for contract stability.
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ject.113  Indeed, if contract breach is always viewed as
undesirable, the appropriate solution is to allow the non-
breaching party to elect specific performance as the remedy for
any breach. Except for cases in which specific performance is
deemed appropriate," 4 punitive damage liability discourages
potentially efficient breaches. It is irrelevant that the inducing
party rather than the party that breached the contract pays the
damages, because the breach presumably would not have oc-
curred but for the actions of the inducing party.
B. TORTIOUs INTERFERENCE wiTH BusINEss RELATIONS
1. Treatment of Prospective Relationships
In the view of many courts, a logical outgrowth of the tort
of interference with contract is the broader action for interfer-
ence with prospective business advantage or relations. Accord-
ing to one decision, "in a civilized community which recognizes
the right of private property among its institutions, the notion
is intolerable that a man should be protected by the law in the
enjoyment of property once it is acquired, but left unprotected
by the law in his effort to acquire it." 1 15 In the English case of
Temperton v. Russell," 6 three trade unions boycotted a supplier
to persuade a contractor to comply with the unions' guidelines
for working conditions. The supplier then sued the unions,
claiming interference with its existing contracts and with fu-
ture business."17 The court extended the common law principle
established in Lumley v. Gye, that one can be liable for tortious
interference without using independently tortious means,118 to
113. See, e.g., Patton, 841 F.2d at 750-51; POSNER, supra note 110, § 4.8;
Dobbs, supra note 48, at 360-61; Perlman, supra note 46, at 79-87.
114. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 129, at 1004 (noting that tort lia-
bility is appropriate in cases where specific performance of the contract would
have been available); Dobbs, supra note 48, at 373-76 (same); cf. POSNER, supra
note 110, § 4.8, at 117-18 (arguing that opportunistic breaches of contract
should be deterred by awards of restitution damages); David Baumer & Patri-
cia Marschall, Willful Breach of Contract for the Sale of Goods: Can the Bane
of Business Be an Economic Bonanza?, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 159, 182-83 (1992)
(arguing that attorneys fees or the double damages rule should be used to de-
ter intentional breaches of contract).
115. Brennan v. United Hatters, 65 A. 165, 171 (N.J. 1906). For a discussion
of early cases in this area, see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 766B cmt. b (1977).
116. 1 Q.B. 715, 723-27 (1893).
117. i at 716.
118. 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 758 (Q.B. 1853). The Temperton court, per Lord
Justice Smith, did not find the strike itself unlawful, 1 Q.B. at 733, although
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cases involving prospective business relations."19 Contending
that both situations involved the same wrongful intent and the
same type of injury, Lord Esher concluded that
[i]t seems rather a fine distinction to say that, where a defendant ma-
liciously induces a person not to carry out a contract already made
with the plaintiff and so injures the plaintiff, it is actionable, but
where he injures the plaintiff by maliciously preventing a person
from entering into a contract with the plaintiff, which he would
otherwise have entered into, it is not actionable.
120
Reflecting present law, the Restatement also indicates that
"isome protection is appropriate against improper interference
with reasonable expectancies of commercial relations even
when an existing contract is lacking."1''  Accordingly, the Re-
statement provides for liability for interference with business
expectancies:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's
prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject
to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from the loss
of the benefits of the relation, whether the interference consists of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into
or continue the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the pro-
spective relation.
122
This broader tort is more troubling than the tort of inter-
ference with contract, because it extends beyond situations in
which there already exists a valid contract. The existence of a
valid contract has several important ramifications. First, a con-
tract defines the precise interests of the aggrieved party. Sec-
ond, it provides some indication of and limitation on the
amount of actual damages recoverable, although the problem of
unbounded punitive damages remains in both torts. Finally,
although one who interferes with the stability of a contractual
relationship may be seen as an interloper and possibly a
tortfeasor, one who interferes merely with a "prospective busi-
Lord Esher did note that the conspiracy to boycott might be independently un-
lawful, id. at 729.
119. 1 Q.B. at 728.
120. Id
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. c, at 9 (1977).
122. IL § 766B. The scope of business relationships covered by this section
is very broad and includes employment opportunities, potential employees, op-
portunities to buy or sell property or services, contract options, and continuing
business relationships. Id cmt. c. For case annotations, see Joel E. Smith, An-
notation, Liability of Third Party for Interference with Prospective Contrac-
tual Relationship Between Two Other Parties, 6 A.L.R.4TH 195 (1981).
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ness advantage" may be essentially a competitor.12 3 In an eco-
nomic system founded upon the principle of free competition,
competitors should not be liable in tort for seeking a legitimate
business advantage.
2. The Relevance of Competition
Recognizing the need for vigorous competition, most courts
give firms considerable leeway to pursue economic advantages,
even if the firms damage competitors' business prospects in the
process.124 As the Restatement notes, "If one party is seeking
to acquire a prospective contractual relation, the other can seek
to acquire it too."'25 There appear to be three approaches to in-
terference by competitors.
First, a minority of states require the plaintiff to prove that
the defendant used improper, tortious, or unlawful means, such
as violence, fraud, or frivolous litigation, to interfere with the
plaintiff's business expectancy.2 6 This line of cases involves
123. The Restatement recognizes this distinction. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. b (1977) ("When the interference is with a con-
tract, an interference is more likely to be treated as improper than in the case
of interference with prospective dealings, particularly in the case of competi-
tion .... ).
124. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 130, at 1012-13 (discuss-
ing privilege of fair competition and providing examples). According to an Illi-
nois decision, "'Competition in trade, business or occupation, though resulting
in loss, will not be restricted or discouraged, whether concerning property or
personal service.'" Langer v. Becker, 531 N.E.2d 830, 833 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(quoting Doremus v. Hennessy, 52 N.E. 924, 926 (Ill. 1898)), appeal denied, 537
N.E.2d 810 (Ill. 1989).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 cmt. a (1977).
126. See 2 CALLMANN, supra note 54, § 9.07 (citing cases); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 48, § 130, at 1009 & nn.37-45 (same); Harper, supra note 54, at 877-
78 & n.25 (same). According to one court,
at common law, a trader.., in order to get another man's customers,
could use any means not involving violation of the criminal laws, or
amounting to "fraud," "duress," or "intimidation." .. . He may use
any mode of persuasion with such a customer, keeping within the lim-
itations stated, which appeals to his self-interest, reason, or even his
prejudices.
Philadelphia Dairy Prods. v. Quaker City Ice Cream Co., 159 A. 3, 5 (Pa. 1932),
quoted in 2 CALLMANN, supra note 54, § 9.07, at 52; see also Nifty Foods Corp.
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832, 838 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that,
under New York law, "unlawful means" refers to criminal or fraudulent con-
duct); Boston Casualty Co. v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 136 F.2d 31, 33-34 (1st
Cir. 1943) (stating that Maine law requires fraud or intimidation as an essen-
tial element of the plaintiff's case); Hiers v. Cohen, 329 A.2d 609, 612 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1973) (affirming the proposition that the plaintiff must prove tor-
tious conduct, such as fraud, duress, or defamation); United Truck Leasing
Corp. v. Geltman, 551 N.E.2d 20, 22-24 (Mass. 1990) (requiring plaintiff to show
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the narrowest zone of liability, and it is defensible given that, to
recover for lost business expectancies, the plaintiff must prove
the defendant committed an independent tort. Under this
view, despite "selfish, fierce, and unfriendly contests for gain
and for profit, the law is indifferent. Not until false, fraudu-
lent, and malicious methods are used to kill off a competitor
does the law take notice."'12
At the other extreme, some states require the plaintiff to
prove only intentional interference and harm to satisfy its
prima facie case, thus shifting to the defendant the burden of
justifying the interference. This approach is the "old view," but
several jurisdictions still adhere to it.128 This view, however,
can chill competition on the merits by forcing the defendant to
prove that it behaved honorably.
Under California law, for example, the defendant's justifi-
cation for interfering with a business expectancy is deemed an
affirmative defense. The reasoning behind this rule is particu-
larly disquieting. California courts consider justification an af-
firmative defense for interference with both an existing
contract and a prospective relationship, because "[t]o treat lack
of justification as an element of the tort when it is a prospective
advantage that is involved would create an additional and un-
warranted difference between the two torts."' 29
Most states, following Prosser and Keeton's reading of the
Restatement, take a middle ground and require the plaintiff to
prove not only intentional interference and harm, but also that
the interference was improper.130 This approach is better than
improper, not merely malicious, conduct); Dobbs, supra note 48, at 365-76 (ad-
vocating similar approach). For a discussion of misuse of litigation, see Gary
Myers, Litigation as a Predatory Practice, 80 KY. L.J. 565 (1992).
127. Union Car Advertising Co. v. Collier, 189 N.E. 463, 467 (N.Y. 1934).
128. E.g., Thompson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 746, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1973)
(recognizing that Alabama and other jurisdictions consider justification an af-
firmative defense); Superior Models v. Tolkien Enters., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
876, 879 (D. Del. 1981) ("[T]he burden of proof in showing privilege as a de-
fense in a tortious interference case rests upon the interferor."); Alyeska Pipe-
line Serv. Co. v. Aurora Air Serv., 604 P.2d 1090, 1095-96 & n.7 (Alaska 1979)
(upholding jury verdict that defendant failed to meet its burden on justifica-
tion issue); Furlev Sales & Assoc. v. North Am. Automotive Warehouse, 325
N.W.2d 20, 25 (Minn. 1982) (stating that Minnesota law requires the defendant
to prove sufficient justification); 2 CALLMANN, supra note 54, § 9.02, at 28 &
n.21 (citing cases); KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 130, at 1011 & n.62 (same).
129. A.F. Arnold & Co. v. Pacific Professional Ins., 104 Cal. Rptr. 96, 99-100
(Ct. App. 1972).
130. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 130, at 1011 (citing cases); see also
supra note 65 (discussing the Restatement's approach to burden of proof on the
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the old rule because it requires the plaintiff to prove that the
interference was unjustified. Still, it retains the ambiguity that
is inherent in the rest of tortious interference law, ultimately
leaving the issue of justification to the jury131 and the scope of
lawful competition undefined.
The Restatement's test for improper interference is the
same seven-factor assessment applied in cases of interference
with contract.132 As with interference with existing contracts,
the defendant's motive and actions are central considerations
under this approach.'33 Once again, the problem is that almost
every interference will involve intentional conduct and some
desire to harm the plaintiff.
In recognition of the importance of competition in the
United States economy, however, section 768 of the Restate-
ment specifically discusses competition as a justification for in-
tentional interference:
One who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a pro-
spective contractual relation with another who is his competitor or
not to continue an existing contract terminable at will does not inter-
fere improperly with the other's relation if
(a) the relation concerns a matter involved in the competition be-
tween the actor and the other and
(b) the actor does not employ wrongful means and
issue of improper interference); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B
& cmt. a (1977) (setting forth elements of intentional interference with pro-
spective contractual relations, incorporating discussion of improper interfer-
ence in § 767 and the comments to that section).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. 1 (1977) ("[A]s with neg-
ligence, when there is room for different views, the determination of whether
the interference was improper or not is ordinarily left to the jury, to obtain its
common feel for the state of community mores and for the manner in which
they would operate upon the facts in question.").
132. Id. § 767; see i& § 766B cmt. d (discussing § 767's test in the context of
improper interference).
133. Id § 766B cmt. d; see also id. § 767 cmt. d ("The desire to interfere
with the other's contractual relations need not.., be the sole motive. If it is
the primary motive it may carry substantial weight in the balancing process
and even if it is only a casual motive it may still be significant in some circum-
stances."). An earlier comment is also relevant:
If the means of interference is itself tortious, as in the case of defama-
tion, injurious falsehood, fraud, violence or threats, there is no greater
justification to interfere with prospective relations than with existing
contracts; but when the means adopted is not innately wrongful and it
is only the resulting interference that is in question as a basis of liabil-
ity, the interference is more likely to be found to be not improper.
Id, § 766B cmt. e. As this comment indicates, the defendant can be liable for
interference despite the use of purely lawful means in at least some undefined
circumstances.
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(c) his action does not create or continue an unlawful restraint of
trade and
(d) his purpose is at least in part to advance his interest in com-
peting with the other.
134
Firms may thus compete and expand their customer base so
long as they do not violate one of the four strictures in section
768.
3. The Burden of Proof
Once again, the Restatement leaves unresolved the issue of
allocating the burdens of pleading and proof, indicating instead
that there is "no consensus" on the issue.135 Allocation of the
burden of proof is crucial in this context, however, because
each of the elements (1)(a) to (1)(d) of section 768 must apply
before the interference will be deemed proper. The defendant,
if it bears the burden, must prove that it acted competitively,
that it did not employ wrongful means, that it did not create or
continue a trade restraint, and that it was motivated in part by
competitive purposes. 136 For instance, in Alyeska Pipeline Ser-
vice Co. v. Aurora Air Service,137 the defendant failed to negate
the plaintiff's claim that it desired to harm the plaintiff rather
than achieve legitimate economic and safety goals.138 The
court's reasoning underscored the importance of the burden of
proof, which in Alyeska was on the defendant. 39 Professor
Dobbs's criticism of such cases is particularly telling: "The
134. I& § 768(1).
135. [Tlhis Section speaks of an interference that is improper or not,
rather than of a specific privilege because there is no consensus that
engaging in competition is an affirmative defense to be raised and
proved by the defendant or is instead simply not improper conduct in-
consistent with the American system of free enterprise. In either
event the provisions of this Section are applicable.
I& § 768 cmt. a; see also 2 CALLMANN, supra note 54, § 9.02, at 28 (noting split
in authority regarding burden of proof). In the words of Henry Maine, "sub-
stantive law has ... the look of being ... secreted in the interstices of proce-
dure." HENRY MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1886).
136. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTs § 768 (1977).
137. 604 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1979).
138. Id at 1094-96.
139. Allocation of the burden of proof to the plaintiff would have affected
the case in two ways. First, the appellate court would have overturned the
jury verdict and granted a new trial because the trial court's instruction placed
the burden squarely on the defendant to justify its actions. Id at 1095 n.7.
Second, this shift in the burden could have affected the outcome in a new trial,
particularly on issues as subjective as a corporate defendant's motive in inter-
fering with the plaintiff's contract. When a jury's decision hinges on a credi-
bility choice, it might use the burden of proof to break the deadlock, finding
that the burden was not met.
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habit becomes to identify the [plaintiff's] interest and to protect
it, and the promise of a balancing... is never fulfilled."'140
The better approach requires the plaintiff to prove unjusti-
fied interference. Contrary to the view in California and other
jurisdictions,141 fundamental distinctions exist between tortious
interference with prospective business relations and with con-
tracts that are not terminable at will. Treatment of the justifi-
cation issue as an affirmative defense is formalistic, given that
the interference should not be deemed tortious unless it is in
fact improper or unjustified.142 Therefore, in several states, the
plaintiff must prove as a part of its prima facie case the absence
of justification for the defendant's actions.143
4. Consideration of Subjective Intent
Section 768 retains an inquiry into the defendant's subjec-
tive intent.144 The competition privilege remains intact if the
defendant has mixed motives-a desire to compete and a desire
to harm the plaintiff.145 If, however, the defendant's "conduct
is directed solely to the satisfaction of his spite or ill will and
not at all to the advancement of his competitive interests over
the person harmed, his interference is held to be improper."'146
As one court stated: "While the effect of the defendant's
140. Dobbs, supra note 48, at 364.
141. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (discussing California's
and other jurisdictions' treatment of justification as an affirmative defense).
142. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1043 (Ariz. 1985)
(rejecting "the formalistic privilege concept in favor of a requirement that an
interference be 'improper' "); see Flintridge Station Assocs. v. American
Fletcher Mfg. Co., 761 F.2d 434, 440-41 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that Indiana
law requires the plaintiff to show absence of justification); Blake v. Levy, 464
A.2d 52, 55 (Conn. 1983) ("[W]e think the better reasoned approach requires
the plaintiff to plead and prove at least some improper motive or improper
means.").
143. See Gregg v. U.S. Indus., 887 F.2d 1462, 1473 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying
Florida law); Machine Maintenance & Equip. Co. v. Cooper Indus., 661 F.
Supp. 1112, 1115 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (applying Missouri law); Smith v. Ford Motor
Co., 221 S.E.2d 282, 290 (N.C. 1976); see also Top Serv. Body Shop v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1369-71 (Or. 1978) (holding that interference must be
"wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself"); supra
note 130 and accompanying text (citing commentary).
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768(1)(d) (1977).
145. See 2 CALLMANN, supra note 54, § 9.16 (discussing cases involving
"mixed motives").
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 cmt. g (1977) (emphasis ad-
ded); see Pino v. Prudential Ins. Co., 689 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
Candalaus Chicago, Inc. v. Evans Mill Supply Co., 366 N.E.2d 319, 326-27 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1977).
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activities may be to cripple plaintiff's business, it is the intent
that is crucial."'147 This view owes its origin, at least in part, to
the landmark case of Tuttle v. Buck.148 In Tuttle, the plaintiff
barber alleged that the defendant, a man of some wealth, estab-
lished a competing barber shop for the sole purpose of destroy-
ing the plaintiff's business and with no genuine intent to
operate a barber business.149 The defendant allegedly solicited
the plaintiff's clients, persuading them by various means to use
the defendant's new shop.150 According to the court:
To divert to one's self the customers of a business rival by the offer of
goods at lower prices is in general a legitimate mode of serving one's
own interest, and justifiable as fair competition. But when a man
starts an opposition place of business, not for the sake of profit to
himself, but regardless of loss to himself, and for the sole purpose of
driving his competitor out of business, and with the intention of him-
self retiring upon the accomplishment of his malevolent purpose, he
is guilty of a wanton wrong and an actionable tort.
1 51
From this case, in which the plaintiff alleged (plausibly or not)
no bona fide competition, a broader principle with disturbing
consequences has developed.
In a number of cases, plaintiffs have alleged that spite
rather than competition motivated a competitor's interfer-
ence. 5 2 For example, in A.F. Arnold & Co. v. Pacific Profes-
147. International Election Sys. Corp. v. Shoup, 452 F. Supp. 684, 711 (E.D.
Pa. 1978), affl'd, 595 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Delaware Valley Trans-
plant Program v. Coye, 722 F. Supp. 1188 (D.N.J. 1989). The Coye court stated:
"While a trader may lawfully engage in the sharpest competition with
those in a like business, by offering extraordinary inducements, or by
representing his good to be cheaper than those of his competitors, yet
when he oversteps that line and commits an act with the malicious
intent of inflicting injury on his rival's business, his conduct is illegal
Id. at 1202 (quoting Kamm v. Flink, 175 A. 62, 66 (N.J. 1934)).
148. 119 N.W. 946 (Minn. 1909).
149. Id at 946.
150. I&
151. Id at 948. A later case, Katz v. Kapper, 44 P.2d 1060 (Cal. Ct. App.
1935), involved similar facts, although the plaintiff did not argue that the de-
fendant had no genuine intent to compete. In Katz, the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant used price cutting and economic threats to coerce customers
into dealing with the defendant instead of the plaintiff. Id. at 1061-62. The
court held that the complaint failed to state a claim because the alleged con-
duct was neither unlawful nor committed in an unlawful manner. Id Simi-
larly, in Beardsley v. Kilmer, 140 N.E. 203 (N.Y. 1923), the defendant, whom
the plaintiffs had ridiculed in their newspaper, opened a newspaper of his own,
drove the plaintiffs out of business, and remained in operation. Id at 205-06.
The court dismissed the complaint because the defendant's motive was not
purely malicious. Id. at 206.
152. See, e.g., International Election Sys. Corp. v. Shoup, 452 F. Supp. 684,
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sional Insurance,53 a California court held that the plaintiff's
tortious interference claim against competitors survives a mo-
tion to dismiss if the plaintiff merely alleges that the defend-
ants' conduct "was wrongful and malicious, and with the intent
to injure plaintiff financially .... It will be for defendants to
justify themselves if plaintiff can prove what it has alleged."'1
In Deauville Corp. v. Federated Department Stores,155 the
court permitted tortious interference claims to go to the jury
because several of the defendant's interoffice memoranda ar-
guably indicated some desire to harm the plaintiff, a competing
real estate developer.156 The court reached this result even
711 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (defendant allegedly hired away employees to drive a com-
petitor out of business), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir. 1979); Ramirez v. Selles,
784 P.2d 433, 436 (Or. 1989) (denying motion to dismiss claim that a competi-
tor's interference was motivated by "malice and personal ill will"); see also
Candalaus Chicago, Inc. v. Evans Mill Supply Co., 366 N.E.2d 319, 326-27 (InI.
App. Ct. 1977) (stating that liability for tortious interference with business ad-
vantage depends on a showing of purpose to injure or destroy); Nesler v.
Fisher & Co., 452 N.W.2d 191, 199 (Iowa 1990) (same); Advance Music Corp. v.
American Tobacco Co., 70 N.E.2d 401, 402 (N.Y. 1946) (denying motion to dis-
miss because complaint alleged that the defendant "wantonly and without
good faith" omitted the plaintiff's song from a weekly radio show); Top Serv.
Body Shop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1371-72 (Or. 1978) (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that defendant desired to destroy plaintiff); 2 CALLMANN,
supra note 54, § 9.15 (citing cases). Some courts, however, have dismissed tor-
tious interference claims when the plaintiff merely alleges malice in con-
clusory terms. E.g., Langer v. Becker, 531 N.E.2d 830, 834-35 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988).
153. 104 Cal. Rptr. 96 (Ct. App. 1972).
154. Id. at 101.
155. 756 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1985); see supra notes 3-12 and accompanying
text (discussing Deauville).
156. 756 F.2d at 1194-97. Some of the key statements by Federated employ-
ees were as follows:
"If we can't get Joske's [a major department store in Texas] (and
there's no assurance that we can)], shouldn't we consider signing up
Monty Ward & as this letter indicates stop the second centre....
"I would appreciate your thoughts as regards.. . Montgomery-
Wards as a suitable alternate to Joske's.
"I strongly urge we talk to MW and head off a new center, if
possible.
"I do not consider Mont. Ward a suitable alternate to Joske's ....
It would only be worth considering if it were strictly a defensive mea-
sure to prevent the building of another center.
"[We recommend] bringing Montgomery Ward into the ... center
and that in doing so they enlist Montgomery Ward['s] best efforts to
also bring Joske's along with them .... This means a five (5) major
store center, which we believe the best tactic to forestall another
center being developed a few miles down the road."
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though the defendant, Federated, indisputably intended to com-
pete for its own benefit by obtaining a major anchor tenant for
its shopping center. 5 7 Unlike the banker-turned-barber in Tut-
tle v. Buck, Federated was a bona fide competitor; still, the
court required it to justify its actions and demonstrate its corpo-
rate intent before a jury.
Another case that illustrates problems with the Restate-
ment approach is the aforementioned Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Aurora Air Service.158 Alyeska, a pipeline company, had
a contract with RCA for communications services.,-9 RCA in
turn contracted with Aurora for air services. Alyeska's con-
tract with RCA permitted Alyeska to modify or cancel the ar-
rangement if necessary; the RCA-Aurora contract included a
provision allowing RCA to cancel at will. 60 After it had a sep-
arate dispute with Aurora, Alyeska exercised its express right
to modify its RCA contract by offering to provide RCA with air
service. When RCA agreed and terminated Aurora's contract,
Aurora sued Alyeska. 16' The court held that the plaintiff suc-
cessfully presented a prima facie case based on Alyeska's inten-
tional interference with the RCA-Aurora contract, and that
Alyeska had the burden to show that it acted with a good faith
desire to further its own economic interests, rather than with
intent to harm Aurora. 62 The court indicated that Alyeska's
liability hinged on which motive predominated: Alyeska's legit-
imate economic interests and safety concerns, or a desire to
harm Aurora. Because the "evidence was susceptible to vary-
ing interpretations on the questions of good faith, justification,
and motive," the court upheld the jury verdict for Aurora. 63
Id at 1189 n.2 (alterations in original) (quoting memoranda between Bill Shif-
fick, a Federated official, and other Federated officials (Oct. 28, 1975)).
157. The record clearly indicates that Federated operated an on-going
shopping center. In fact, Federated's mall, called Greenspoint, was already op-
erating when the plaintiff began considering its own development. Id at 1186-
87. Moreover, the same memoranda that indicated a desire to harm the plain-
tiff also showed a desire to obtain Montgomery Ward as a tenant in lieu of
Joske's, another store. Id. at 1189 n.2 (quoted supra at note 156). Thus, the
court should have recognized Federated's strong competitive interest as a mat-
ter of law.
158. 604 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1979).
159. Id. at 1092.
160. Id.
161. Id at 1092-93.
162. Id at 1095-96 & n.7.
163. Id at 1093-94. Alyeska claimed it was motivated by safety and eco-
nomic concerns, while Aurora argued that Alyeska initiated the sequence of
cancellations because of ill will towards it that arose out of an earlier dispute
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Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,'64 a complex case in-
volving antitrust and tortious interference claims, further dem-
onstrates the problem of evaluating the defendant's subjective
motive. The jury instructions in the case obfuscated the critical
issues of intent and the right to interfere. The defendant con-
tended that the jury instructions permitted the jury to impose
liability for its lawful actions based solely on evidence of intent
to injure the plaintiff.1 65 Although the court stated that the in-
structions required improper conduct,1 6 6 the language of the in-
structions was, at best, ambiguous and may have permitted
liability based solely on evidence of the defendant's mixed
motives.167
Finally, in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipe-
line Co. of America,168 the Tenth Circuit established a "protect
your competitor" rule. Two pipeline companies had a contract
under which one purchased natural gas from the other.169
When the buyer reduced its purchases from the seller and be-
gan obtaining supplies directly from the seller's supplier, the
seller brought suit, claiming tortious interference with its con-
tract with the supplier, as well as attempted monopolization
and other antitrust violations. 70 The court affirmed a jury ver-
dict for the seller on the tortious interference claim, but over-
turned the antitrust verdict because no evidence of a dangerous
probability of success supported the attempted monopolization
claim.' 71 Although the court was "sympathetic" to the impor-
tance of permitting free competition as long as no unlawful
conduct occurs, it adopted the Restatement view "'that motive
can be a determinative factor in converting otherwise lawful
between the two firms. Id- at 1092-94. For further discussion and criticism of
this case, see Dobbs, supra note 48, at 348-50.
164. 663 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Kan. 1987), qff'd in par4 rev'd in part, 899 F.2d
951 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990).
165. I& at 1427-34.
166. I& at 1429. The court cited the Restatements vague discussion of mo-
tive in tortious interference cases to support this conclusion. Id
167. Id at 1427-29 (setting forth jury instructions). The instructions did
not expressly require a showing of improper actions; they required only evi-
dence that the defendant "undertook this conduct with the wrongful intent of
injuring or destroying" the plaintiff's business. 1d, at 1427. The jury instruc-
tions in this case resembled hypothetical instructions that Professor Dobbs
used to illustrate problems with the focus on state of mind in tortious interfer-
ence law. See Dobbs, supra note 48, at 349.
168. 885 F.2d 683, 690-97 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 972 (1990).
169. Id at 685.
170. Id. at 685-86.
171. Id at 697.
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behavior into "improper" conduct for which the defendant will
be liable.' "172
Incredibly, the court found that the buyer's freedom to
make purchasing decisions could "be limited by a requirement
not to exercise its discretion for the purpose of interfering with
[the seller's] contractual relationships.' 1 73 Hence, although the
seller could not show that the buyer violated the antitrust laws
or breached its contractual duties, the court permitted the
seller to recover the tort portion of a $412 million verdict 74
without explaining when a refusal to deal crosses the bounds of
legality. Although the court recognized that the antitrust laws
protect "'competition not competitors,' "175 it interpreted tort
law to protect competitors, not competition.
The problem with these cases is that they skew the balance
between competition and protection of business expectancies, a
balance the court in Tuttle v. Buck was careful to recognize:
"The problem has been to so adjust matters as to preserve the
principle of competition and yet guard against its abuse to the
unnecessary injury to the individual.' 76 It is all too easy for
the plaintiff to highlight one or two vindictive statements of
someone affiliated with the defendant and to base its claim on
the resulting issue of motive, a factual determination a jury
must resolve. The nature of business rivalry, however, neces-
sarily involves some degree of enmity and a desire to defeat the
competition. 77
Moreover, liability based solely on the defendant's motive
contradicts the principle that a lawful act should not become
172. Id at 691 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. d
(1977)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 685.
175. Id. at 697 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320
(1962)).
176. 119 N.W. 946, 947 (Minn. 1909).
177. See Chambers v. Baldwin, 15 S.W. 57 (Ky. 1891). The court in Cham-
bers noted:
Competition frequently engenders, not only a spirit of rivalry, but en-
mity; and, if the motive influencing every business transaction that
may result in injury or inconvenience to a business rival was made
the test of its legality, litigation and strife would be vexatiously and
unnecessarily increased, and the sale and exchange of commodities
very much hindered.
Id at 59-60. A case in which employees' off-hand statements served as a basis
for tort liability is Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 756 F.2d 1183
(5th Cir. 1985), discussed supra notes 3-12, 155-57 and accompanying text.
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unlawful because of wrongful motive.178 The classic case of
Beardsley v. Kilmer' 79 illustrates this point. In Beardsley, the
plaintiff's newspaper repeatedly criticized the Kilmers and
their family patent medicine business.1 80 The Kilmers decided
to establish a competing newspaper to fight the plaintiff and to
avenge their good name. They lured away subscribers and ad-
vertisers, hired some of the plaintiff's employees, and eventu-
ally drove the plaintiff out of business.' 8 ' In rejecting the
plaintiff's tortious interference claim, the court indicated that,
even though the Kilmers obviously intended to drive the plain-
tiff out of business, this did not make their conduct illegal, be-
cause they engaged in bona fide competition, remained in
business after the plaintiff folded, and did not commit any un-
lawful acts.'8 2 The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that
it would be unsafe to go further in fastening an actionable liability
upon acts in themselves lawful. We cannot afford to move ihe law to
a stage where any person who, for his own advantage, starts a new
business, will be compelled to submit to the decision of a jury the
question whether also there was not a malicious purpose to injure
some person who is thus brought under a new and disadvantageous
competition. 18
3
Despite the sound analysis of the New York court in Beardsley
v. Kilmer, many competitors have been called to account for
their otherwise lawful market conduct because of the motive
inquiry in tortious interference law.
Because of the ambiguities inherent in the motive inquiry
in tortious interference law, many questionable cases can sur-
vive summary judgment, often forcing defendants to settle
rather than run the risk of adverse jury verdicts and possible
178. See, e.g., 1 NIMS, supra note 54, § 164, at 457-59 & n.7 (citing cases).
Callmann notes Judge Cooley's statement that "malicious motives make a bad
case worse, but they cannot make that wrong which is in its essence lawful." 2
CALLMANN, supra note 54, § 9.14, at 74. Callmann proceeds to note that "mod-
em courts" no longer follow that rule rigidly and that "the pendulum has
since moved to the other extreme." Id.; see also Dobbs, supra note 48, at 347-
50 (criticizing focus on defendant's state of mind); Perlman, supra note 46, at
94-97 (same).
179. 140 N.E. 203 (N.Y. 1923).
180. Id. at 203.
181. Id.
182. Id at 204-05.
183. Id. at 206; see also Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 883 F.2d 1101, 1113 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that, under Rhode Is-
land law, "[clonduct in furtherance of business competition is generally held to
justify interference with others' contracts, so long as the conduct involves
neither 'wrongful means' nor 'unlawful restraint of trade' "), cert denied, 494
U.S. 1027 (1990).
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punitive damage awards. Courts apply the widely accepted rule
that summary judgment is inappropriate in cases where intent
is an issue.'84 Further, courts often emphasize that tortious in-
terference claims should be resolved on a case-by-case basis,
generally by a jury, and sometimes even under a standard of
"common morality or of law."' s5 This inquiry, which focuses in
part on the issue of the defendant's motive, is inevitably prone
to error and misapplication. Professor Dobbs notes that the fo-
cus on the defendant's subjective state of mind "may invite the
law to judge character or the defendant's whole being, not
merely his conduct," and may result in judgments based on a
"dislike of his person."'81 6 Consequently, plaintiffs often can
proceed to trial, and then to victory, on tortious interference
claims despite the failure of their antitrust count, either on
summary disposition or at trial. 8 7 If the inquiry is limited to
objective criteria, such as whether the defendant's conduct was
improper, cases more readily can be resolved as a matter of
184. See, e.g., Capital Options Invs. v. Goldberg Bros. Commodities, 958
F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing difficulty of obtaining summary judg-
ment in tortious interference case because the plaintiff must show that the de-
fendant acted with actual malice); 2 CALLMANN, supra note 54, § 9.02, at 282
("The defendant's motive is a jury question."). For examples of cases in which
the antitrust claim failed while the tort claim proceeded to trial, see infra
notes 187 and 212.
185. Leslie Blau Co. v. Alfieri, 384 A.2d 859, 866 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.)
("The very nature of [the tort] prohibits a 'rule of thumb' in every case."), cer-
tication denied, 391 A.2d 523 (N.J. 1978); see also Deauville Corp. v. Feder-
ated Dep't Stores, 756 F.2d 1183, 1197 (5th Cir. 1985) (imposing liability for
"'conduct below the behavior of fair men similarly situated" (quoting 45 AM.
Jun. 2D InterferenCe § 1 (1969))); Champion v. Wright, 740 S.W.2d 848, 854-55
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding jury instructions equating reasonable competi-
tion with "fair play").
186. Dobbs, supra note 48, at 348.
187. See, e.g., Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 885
F.2d 683, 690-97 (10th Cir. 1989) (affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff on a
tortious interference claim, but overturning an antitrust verdict because there
was no evidence of a dangerous probability of success to support the attempted
monopolization claim), cert denied, 498 U.S. 972 (1990); Deauville, 756 F.2d at
1197 (affirming a directed verdict for the defendants on antitrust claims, but
requiring tortious interference claims to go to the jury); see also cases cited in-
fra note 212.
When a federal court dismisses an antitrust claim, it will often dismiss
pendent state law claims (such as tortious interference) as well, unless there is
diversity jurisdiction or remaining valid federal claims. Still, the plaintiff can
bring the state law claims in state court, because the dismissal, of course, is
without prejudice. See Les Shockley Racing v. National Hot Rod Ass'n, 884





Unlike tortious interference law, antitrust law requires
such an objective inquiry. The Supreme Court's decision in
Matsuhita indicates that summary judgment is proper in anti-
trust cases when the plaintiff fails to produce specific facts to
support its claim, that is, "evidence (that tends to exclude the
possibility) that the alleged conspirators acted indepen-
dently."'1 9 Underlying the Court's summary judgment rule is
the concern that unabated litigation might chill legitimate com-
petitive behavior. 90 This chilling effect can occur just as easily
as a result of potential liability in tort, particularly for punitive
damages.191
In addition, courts often use inadequate jury instructions
when dealing with tortious interference claims. In one case,
the trial court listed essentially the same elements in causes of
action for interference with existing contracts and with pro-
spective business relations, 192 despite the significant differences
between the two situations. Another instruction in the same
case allowed the plaintiff essentially to recover solely on a
showing of malice, defined as ill will or disregard for the plain-
tiff's rights.193 Other instructions have allowed recovery based
188. See, e.g., Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 883 F.2d 1101, 1113-14 (1st Cir. 1989) (affirming grant of judgment
nLo.v. for defendant because plaintiff failed to show wrongful means or re-
straint of trade), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
189. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588
(1986) (citation omitted).
190. Id- at 594 ("[M]istaken inferences in cases such as this one are espe-
cially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are
designed to protect."). The Court also noted that "courts should not permit
factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences are implausible, because
the effect of such practices is often to deter procompetitive conduct." Id at
593; see also DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d
1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989) (discussing increased availability of summary dispo-
sition in antitrust cases after Matsushita), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990);
Thomas Jorde & Mark Lemley, Summary Judgment in Antitrust Cases: Un-
derstanding Monsanto and Matsushita, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 271 (1991) (dis-
cussing the increased availability of summary judgment in antitrust cases and
the problems lower courts encounter applying the Matsushita standard).
191. See supra part II.A.5 (discussing punitive damages in tortious interfer-
ence cases).
192. Nesler v. Fisher & Co., 452 N.W.2d 191, 196-97 (Iowa 1990) (quoting
trial court's jury instructions); Feltham, supra note 103, at 143 (criticizing Tex-
aco v. Pennzoil jury instructions because they did not clearly indicate that
Pennzoil and Getty were at the precontractual stage when Texaco made its
competitive offer).
193. Nesler, 452 N.W.2d at 196 ("[W]hen a defendant acts with malice to in-
flict injury upon his rival's business, his conduct becomes illegal . . . ."); see
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on undefined standards of "fair play."'194
In short, as one tort commentator has stated, "The test is
admittedly vague, and the applications are difficult to classify,
but the law is developing at a rapid rate."'195 It is essential that
tortious interference cases not degenerate into battles over
whether the jury will approve of the defendant's brand of vig-
orous competition.
5. Vagueness in Defining Improper Means
A final problem is ambiguity regarding what constitutes
improper means. In Azar v. Lehigh Corp.,196 the plaintiff land
company offered free "vacations" during which customers
would view property available for sale. The defendant sought
out these customers and persuaded them to buy property from
him instead. The court upheld a temporary restraining order
barring the defendant from soliciting the plaintiff's custom-
ers.197 Regardless of the merits of this particular case, given
that the defendant was arguably free-riding on the investment
the plaintiff had made in the real estate prospects, the court set
a troubling standard. The court indicated that competition, like
war, has its limits and concluded: "In the final analysis, the is-
sue seems to turn upon whether the subject conduct is consid-
ered to be 'unfair' according to contemporary business
also Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1427 (D. Kan. 1987)
(requiring only evidence of interference, harm, and wrongful intent to prove
tortious interference), qff'd in par4 rev'd in part, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert
denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990).
194. The jury instruction from Champion v. Wright, 740 S.W.2d 848, 854-55
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987), is worth full quotation:
You are instructed that reasonable competition is limited to what is
considered "fair play." If the means of competition are fair, you may
find that a privilege exists, however, if the acts complained of do not
rest on some legitimate interest or if there is sharp dealing or over-
reaching or other conduct below the behavior of fair men similarly
situated, you must find that the actions were not privileged.
See also Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 219 A.2d 635, 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1966) (stating that test is whether the conduct was "both injurious and trans-
gressive of generally accepted standards of common morality or of law") (cita-
tions omitted).
195. 2 BERNARD E. WrTKIN, SUMMARY OF CALiFoRNIA LAW 1332-33 (1968),
quoted in A.F. Arnold & Co. v. Pacific Professional Ins. Co., 104 Cal. Rptr. 96,
99 (Ct. App. 1972).
196. 364 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
197. Id. at 861-62. The defendant identified the plaintiff's customers by the
plaintiff's promotional literature that they carried. He followed the happy va-
cationers, struck up conversations, and began his sales pitch. Id.
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standards."'198 This "business ethics" standard offers firms and
courts little guidance and is not grounded upon a showing of in-
dependently illegal action by the competitor. It also may
change over time: "The nature of the conduct which is accepta-
ble today may, on examination at trial, prove unacceptable to-
morrow as the mores of our market place change and as we
require more stringent standards of conduct."'199
Machine Maintenance & Equipment Co. v. Cooper Indus-
tries200 reflects a questionable finding of improper means. A
terminated distributor sued the manufacturer, claiming anti-
trust violations and tortious interference with its customer con-
tracts.201  The manufacturer terminated the distributor's
contract in order to do business with a newly established dis-
tributor, and the contract permitted the manufacturer broad
discretion to terminate.20 2 Nonetheless, the court held there
was sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict based on the
manufacturer's alleged use of improper means of interfer-
ence.20 3 The court stressed that the manufacturer gave short
notice of termination, causing customers to become dissatisfied
with the plaintiff and to switch to the new distributor, and that
it used the plaintiff's customer lists to call customers, inform-
ing them that the plaintiff had been terminated because of poor
performance.204
Although the short notice violated the contract,20 5 there
was no indication that the use of customer lists violated a trade
secret, nor was there any evidence that the manufacturer made
false statements to customers. Thus, the plaintiff effectively
transformed a breach of contract claim (for the termination
without adequate notice) into a tort claim, for which the jury
awarded $1,790,342 in actual damages and a startling ten mil-
lion dollars in punitive damages.20 6
198. Id. at 862. The court derived this test from Prosser's analysis. Id; see
also Inventive Music Ltd. v. Cohen, 617 F.2d 29, 32 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam)
(applying standard of "common morality or of law"). See generally 2
CALLMANN, supra note 54, § 9.18 (discussing improper means cases).
199. A.F. Arnold & Co., 104 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
200. 661 F. Supp. 1112 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
201. Id. at 1114.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1116.
204. Id.
205. Id. The contract provided for termination upon 90 days notice, but the
manufacturer only gave 34 days notice. Id at 1114.
206. Id. at 1114. The district court later reduced the punitive damages
award to $100,000. Id. at 1118.
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Although the approach in Azar and Machine Maintenance
serves the purpose of capturing pesky defendants whose behav-
ior seems objectionable, it does not inform competitors when
and in what forms courts will permit aggressive competition.
Courts should instead define improper means to include means
that constitute an independent tort, breach of fiduciary duty, or
antitrust violation.207 So defined, the improper means standard
would provide a governing principle for decision making and
guidance for interested parties.
III. RECONCILING ANTITRUST AND TORT LAW
A. HARMONIZING PRINCIPLES
State tortious interference law and federal antitrust law
have developed largely independently. Commentators have
given little attention to the interplay between these two impor-
tant fields of business regulation.208 In theory the two areas
should be consistent and, indeed, complementary. After all,
"'[t]he policy of the common law has always been in favor of
free competition.' "209 Indeed, as one court has stated,
"'[c]ompetition in business, even though carried to the extent
of ruining a rival, constitutes justifiable interference in an-
other's business relations, and is not actionable.' "210 Moreover,
courts have interpreted the antitrust laws to further our na-
tional competition policy.2 11 In many cases, a plaintiff can seek
recovery under both antitrust and tortious interference theo-
ries. These cases often involve allegations of refusals to deal,
predatory price cutting, and other forms of exclusionary
conduct.2' 2
207. Cf. Dobbs, supra note 48, at 365-68 (discussing interference claims
properly based on other torts, duress, fiduciary duty violations, and restraints
of trade).
208. See sources cited supra note 46.
209. Warde v. Kaiser, 887 F.2d 97, 102 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting KEETON ET
AL., supra note 48, § 130, at 1012).
210. Dunnivant v. Bi-State Auto Parts, 851 F.2d 1575, 1584 (11th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Beasley-Bennett Elec. Co. v. Gulf Coast Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contrac-
tors Ass'n, 134 So. 2d 427, 429 (Ala. 1961)). The Restatement expressly recog-
nizes the value and role of competition and its necessary corollary, economic
self-interest. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmts. f, g (1977).
211. See supra part I (discussing the promotion of competition as a major
purpose of the antitrust laws).
212. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 261-62
(1989) (tortious interference and predatory pricing claims); Reazin v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 955 (10th Cir.) (claims included monopoliza-
tion, restraint of trade, and tortious interference), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005
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Nonetheless, disturbing inconsistencies in the law in these
two fields have developed. The doctrinal underpinnings in the
two fields differ widely, leading to troubling outcomes and
questionable reasoning in several areas of tortious interference
law. Today, although the two bodies of law are parallel and
consistent in some respects, significant inconsistency and ten-
sion remain in tortious interference law.
Federal antitrust law does not mandate that state law con-
form unwaveringly to the strictures and policies of the Sher-
man Act. The Supreme Court emphasized this point in
California v. ARC America Corp.213 In that case, several states
brought suit under federal and state antitrust laws against ce-
ment producers, alleging that the defendants unlawfully con-
spired to raise prices.214 The states were indirect purchasers of
cement; they purchased the cement from middle-level distribu-
tors, rather than directly from the manufacturers who alleg-
edly fixed prices.215 Federal antitrust law generally precludes
indirect purchasers from recovering damages against conspira-
tors, permitting only direct purchasers to sue and collect dam-
ages.216 Some states' antitrust laws, however, permit indirect
(1990); E.W. French & Sons v. General Portland, Inc., 885 F.2d 1392, 1394-95
(9th Cir. 1989) (claims included price fixing, conspiracy to eliminate competi-
tor by cutting prices, unfair competition, and tortious interference); H.J., Inc.
v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1540-43, 1548 (8th Cir. 1989)
(upholding jury findings of predatory pricing and tortious interference);
Machine Maintenance & Equip. Co. v. Cooper Indus., 661 F. Supp. 1112, 1114-
19 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (upholding jury verdict on tortious interference claim and
overturning antitrust verdict because plaintiff did not show any harm to com-
petition or unreasonable restraint of trade); KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, §
130, at 1014 nn.85-90 (citing cases); see also DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington
Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1507-19 (11th Cir. 1989) (rejecting tortious
interference claims, but allowing antitrust and fraud claims to go to trial), cert
denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990); Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 883 F.2d 1101, 1113-14 (1st Cir. 1989) (rejecting monopolization
and tortious interference claims where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate
wrongful means or unlawful restraint of trade), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027
(1990); Dunnivant v. Bi-State Auto Parts, 851 F.2d 1577, 1577-84 (11th Cir.
1988) (affirming summary judgment for defendants on monopolization, re-
straint of trade, and tort claims); Top Serv. Body Shop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582
P.2d 1365 (Or. 1978) (rejecting tortious interference and price discrimination
claims); Dobbs, supra note 48, at 367-68 (discussing misuse of economic power
as the basis for a tort claim).
213. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
214. Id. at 96.
215. Id. at 96-98.
216. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735-36 (1977). In Illinois
Brick, the Court noted exceptions to the indirect purchaser rule, id. at 732
n.12, 736 n.16, that are not pertinent to this Article.
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purchasers to sue and recover damages to the extent distribu-
tors passed along overcharges to indirect purchasers. 217
The issue in ARC America was whether federal antitrust
law preempted the state laws that permitted indirect purchaser
recoveries. 218 Noting the presumption against preemption, the
Court concluded that Congress had not expressly preempted
state antitrust laws, that federal law had not occupied the field
and, finally, that the state indirect purchaser rules did not con-
flict with the policies and objectives of federal law.219 Further,
the Court indicated that the federal antitrust laws would not
preempt other state laws regarding unfair competition: "Given
the long history of state common-law and statutory remedies
against monopolies and unfair business practices, it is plain that
this is an area traditionally regulated by the States."220  This
dictum undercuts the case for preemption of most business
torts. Tortious interference law, however, is arguably distin-
guishable from other areas, such as unfair competition. Be-
cause unfettered tortious interference liability can have a
chilling effect on competition without furthering a clearly ar-
ticulated countervailing policy, those broad claims may be pre-
empted because they directly conflict with antitrust policies.
Nonetheless, in light of the Court's reasoning in ARC America,
federal antitrust law does not generally preempt state tortious
interference law, even in situations in which the tort doctrines
cast a wider net of liability.22'
Despite Congress's apparent willingness to allow state law
to diverge from the Sherman Act and other federal antitrust
law, some reconciliation and consistency is desirable. A narrow
interpretation of tortious interference claims would avoid pre-
emption arguments based on conflicts with federal antitrust
217. ARC America, 490 U.S. at 98 & n.3 (citing state laws, including those
of Alabama, Minnesota, and California, that expressly or otherwise permit in-
direct purchasers to sue for overcharges).
218. Id- at 100.
219. Id- at 100-06.
220. Id. at 101 (footnote omitted).
221. See id. at 105 ("Ordinarily, state causes of action are not preempted
solely because they impose liability over and above that authorized by federal
law .... "). Moreover, the Sherman Act does not provide "remedies for all
torts committed by or against persons in interstate commerce." Hunt v.
Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 826 (1945). But cf Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell
Woodbury Corp., 57 F.2d 96, 103 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 552 (1932)
(permitting antitrust liability based on intent to harm). Certainly room exists
for tort law to cover conduct, such as independently tortious acts, that is im-




policies favoring competition and efficiency. Moreover, to the
extent state tortious interference law regulates business activ-
ity with the same goals as antitrust, the two areas of law should
seek consistency in result and reasoning. Antitrust law, after
all, focuses its attention on group behavior and seeks to elimi-
nate the activities of large firms that are exclusionary or an-
ticompetitive. Tortious interference law governs the actions of
all firms, both large and small. Both seek to permit free com-
petition on the merits. Although tortious interference law is
also designed to protect the security and integrity of business
relationships, this interest should be balanced against compet-
ing considerations.
When judges and legislators contemplate modifying the
common law rules regarding tortious interference law, they
should consider, as a guiding policy, the importance of competi-
tion and the economic reasoning that has been incorporated in
federal antitrust law. As with antitrust law, courts have devel-
oped tortious interference law into a brief set of guiding princi-
ples, including the paramount principle of free competition.
B. CLAIMS INVOLVING CoMPETrroRs
Antitrust law recognizes vigorous competition as a founda-
tion of the nation's economic system.222 Prosser and Keeton
noted that "[t]he policy of the common law has always been in
favor of free competition. '223 Nonetheless, tortious interfer-
ence law has, at times, demonstrated hostility to this basic tenet
of our economic system. The early English cases took place
during severe labor shortages and were "designed to prevent la-
borers from jumping ship for higher wages. Traces of this sort
of anti-competitive thinking certainly can be discerned in case
law from subsequent centuries. ' 224 Even some modern deci-
sions fail to discuss whether the plaintiff and defendant com-
peted with one another, giving this fact no importance to the
outcome of a tortious interference case.225
Modern tortious interference law should seek to advance
222. See supra part I (discussing the promotion of competition as a primary
purpose of the antitrust laws).
223. KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 130, at 1012; see also Frandsen v. Jen-
sen-Sundquist Agency, 802 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) ("One of
the most firmly established principles of the common law is that competition
is not a tort.") (citation omitted).
224. Warde v. Kaiser, 887 F.2d 97, 103 n.2 (6th Cir. 1989).
225. 2 CALLMANN, supra note 54, § 9.02, at 26 & n.4 (citing cases).
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free competition and economic efficiency,226 by allowing compe-
tition on the merits. In the words of one court, "Lawful compe-
tition is not actionable even though carried to the extent of
ruining a rival. '227
Furthering the interest in free competition on the merits
requires courts to modify tortious interference law governing
at-will contracts, voidable contracts, punitive damages, and pro-
spective business advantages. With regard to at-will and voida-
ble contracts, the countervailing interest in contract stability
should not be given controlling weight.22 These are not valid,
specific contracts of definite duration, in which the parties ex-
pect performance as promised. The law, by definition, permits
a party to end such an agreement, either because a flaw in the
contract renders it voidable or because it is expressly or implic-
itly determined to be an at-will contract. Allowing a party to
avoid performance of a voidable contract or to end an at-will
agreement thus furthers important contract law policies-poli-
cies that trump the need for general contractual stability. Tor-
tious interference law should recognize this interest and permit
a competitor to interfere with at-will and voidable contracts,
unless the competitor employs means that are otherwise
unlawful.
On the issue of damages for interference with an existing
contract, courts should not permit the plaintiff to recover puni-
tive damages unless it can demonstrate independently tortious
or wrongful acts, rather than merely the act of interference.
Permitting punitive damages in a simple case of interference
with contract deters efficient breaches of contract.229 If the de-
fendant's actions involve a serious, independent wrong, the in
226. See Warde, 887 F.2d at 103 (stating that modern law seeks to protect
advantages accruing from free competition and economic efficiency); Ocean
State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 883 F.2d 1101, 1114
(1st Cir. 1989) (describing antitrust laws as the only true indicator "of whether
or not [competitors'] conduct can be found to be 'wrongful' or 'illegitimate'-
and, hence, tortious"), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
227. Candalaus Chicago, Inc. v. Evans Mill Supply Co., 366 N.E.2d 319, 327
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977); see also Conoco, Inc. v. Inman Oil Co., 774 F.2d 895, 906
(8th Cir. 1985) (holding supplier was not liable for charging a customer of its
distributor a lower price than the distributor offered); Fairbanks, Morse & Co.
v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 63 F.2d 702, 705-06 (5th Cir. 1933) (noting the interest
in competition can outweigh protection of a firm's business expectancies), cert.
denied, 290 U.S. 655 (1933).
228. See supra notes 77-104 and accompanying text (discussing liability for
interference with at-will and voidable contracts).




terrorem effect of punitive damages is appropriate. If not, the
plaintiff's recovery logically should be limited to actual dam-
ages and perhaps attorneys' fees.
With regard to tortious interference with prospective busi-
ness relations, the need for modification is less serious, because
the law already recognizes a right to compete for future busi-
ness. The inquiry into motive, however, should be eliminated
whenever the defendant is a bona fide competitor of the plain-
tiff.230 In such cases, although the defendant may have made a
vindictive statement showing mixed motives, the defendant's
right to compete vigorously should preclude a tort claim.231 In
every case, it would seem, a competitor would be motivated at
least in part by economic self-interest when it interferes with a
prospective business relationship. As one court has observed,
"A competitor has an absolute right to take away as much of
the 'other fellow's' business as he can lawfully. '23
2
Even in the worst case, where an emotional competitor
harbors ill will towards the plaintiff, a court should still find
that the competitor's actions are motivated in part by a desire
to compete. In the rare case 233 of a defendant acting out of
pure spite, the introduction of this subjective state-of-mind is-
sue into the competition analysis unnecessarily complicates the
test. Juries would often have difficulty resolving this question
accurately, given its subjective nature. Similarly, the cost of ju-
230. See supra part II.B.4 (criticizing the inquiry into motive).
231. See, e.g., Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 883 F.2d 1101, 1113-14 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating competitor interference
generally is lawful absent wrongful means or restraint of trade), cert denied,
494 U.S. 1027 (1990); Ethyl Corp. v. Baiter, 386 So. 2d 1220, 1225-26 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (holding privileged behavior not unlawful despite an allegation
of malice), rev. denied, 392 So. 2d 1371 (Fla.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 955 (1981);
Boulier v. Macauley, 15 S.W. 60, 60-61 (Ky. 1891) (holding bad motive does not
render a lawful act unlawful).
232. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Wordtronics Corp., 561 A.2d 694, 697 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1989).
233. In competitive cases it is virtually impossible to find an instance
where one party, from no other motive but sheer malevolence, at-
tempts to injure or destroy the business of his competitor. Were
there such a situation, proof of the solely malevolent motive would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the defendant could always
establish that he derived profit thereby ....
2 CAMMANN, supra note 54, § 9.15 (footnote omitted). Indeed, Callmann's text
discusses only two cases on purely malevolent motives. One is Tuttle v. Buck,
119 N.W. 946 (Minn. 1909), discussed supra notes 148-51 and accompanying
text, and the other is Boggs v. Duncan-Schell Furniture Co., 143 N.W. 482
(Iowa 1913), which involved the improper means of false advertising. See 2
CALLMANN, supra note 54, § 9.15.
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dicial error would be high, potentially chilling legitimate com-
petition. Finally, section 768(1)(a) of the Restatement includes
a provision for cases in which the interference does not relate
to the competition between the plaintiff and the defendant.23
This provision should allow plaintiffs to get to a jury in those
cases in which the interference does not involve bona fide
competition.
By eliminating purpose as a determinative factor, courts
will apply tortious interference standards that are consistent
with the goals of antitrust. "An evil intent alone is insufficient
to establish a violation under the rule of reason, although proof
of intent may help a court assess the market impact of the de-
fendants' conduct."235 Although a firm may engage in exclu-
sionary behavior for the purpose of driving out a competitor,
the firm should not be liable unless the behavior meets the
standards for an independent antitrust violation.236
Finally, the burden of proof of improper interference
should fall squarely on the plaintiff and serve as part of the
prima facie case. This change from the existing law in many
jurisdictions237 reduces the risk that a defendant must justify
its lawful competitive behavior. Rather, the defendant can
point to the plaintiff's failure to show any impropriety.
It would simplify and improve competition analysis to elim-
inate the "purpose" prong and place on the plaintiff the burden
of proving that the competitor's interference was improper.
The plaintiff would be free to show that the interference did
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768(1)(a) (1977); cf. id. cmt. g
(noting the overlap between this provision and the provision dealing with
purpose).
235. Northwest Power Prods. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir.
1978) (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)),
cert denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); see also Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 113 S.
Ct. 884, 890-92 (1993) (holding that evidence of anticompetitive intent and con-
duct are insufficient to show a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, absent evi-
dence of market power).
236. For example, a number of cases have held that predatory pricing con-
stitutes improper means and can serve as the basis for a tortious interference
claim. E.g., H.J., Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1540-43,
1548 (8th Cir. 1989); C.E. Servs. v. Control Data Corp., 759 F.2d 1241, 1249 (5th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1037 (1985); see aZso Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 261-64 (1989) (upholding jury verdict finding
predatory pricing and tortious interference); Ocean State Physicians Health
Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 883 F.2d 1101, 1114 (1st Cir. 1989) (using an-
titrust rules as "barometer" for competitor's tortious interference claim), cert
denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64 (discussing approach
whereby courts allocate the burden of proof to the defendant).
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not involve bona fide competition, that the defendant employed
wrongful means, or that the defendant created or continued a
restraint of trade.
A few courts have adopted a similar approach. One court
in New Jersey concluded:
Liability of a competitor depends upon whether the means used to
compete are unlawful. If the competitor employs unlawful means, he
is liable. For example, if a competitor uses violence or engages in
fraud or intimidation, or misrepresents, or threatens civil or criminal
actions, or violates the law, then the competition is considered to be
outside of permissible parameters, and liability will ensue.
238
This approach would harmonize the treatment of competition
under antitrust and tortious interference law, while leaving in-
tact the tort law interest in the stability and integrity of ex-
isting, valid contracts. It also would continue to permit
plaintiffs to recover for harm to existing or prospective contrac-
tual expectancies that are damaged as a result of a competitor's
actions, provided those actions are independently tortious or
constitute unlawful restraints of trade.
C. DEALER TERMINATION CLAIMS
Thus far, the discussion of antitrust and tortious interfer-
ence has focused mainly on cases involving competitors, which
present the most common setting for these claims. Nonethe-
less, a significant number of cases have involved a terminated
dealer's lawsuit against a manufacturer or supplier. Unlike
cases involving direct competitors, these cases implicate the
conflicting interests of manufacturers in establishing dealer
networks suitable to their needs, and of dealers in stable busi-
ness arrangements. Once again, however, these cases involve
the interplay of antitrust and business tort.
The terminated dealer's tort claim typically alleges that the
manufacturer wrongly interfered with the dealer's business re-
lationship with its customers by ending the dealer contract.
239
238. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Wordtronics Corp., 561 A.2d 694, 697 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1989) (citations omitted). The court also observed, "We live, after
all, in a society consumed by the desire to acquire wealth, enamored by entre-
preneurship and enthralled by success. Competition is always the premise,
winning always the goal." Id at 698.
239. The manufacturer cannot be liable for interfering with the dealer con-
tract itself because it is a party to that contract. See Childers Oil Co. v. Exxon
Corp., 960 F.2d 1265, 1271 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Tortious interference claims lie
only against a party that is a stranger to the relationship."); see also Machine
Maintenance & Equip. Co. v. Cooper Indus., 661 F. Supp. 1112, 1114-19 (E.D.
Mo. 1987) (citing cases) (upholding jury verdict against manufacturer on
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The manufacturer normally responds by claiming that there
were grounds for the termination and that a manufacturer
should be free to deal with whomever it believes will most ef-
fectively market its product or service.
Courts generally recognize a conditional privilege to inter-
fere based on the manufacturer's financial interest in the
dealer's business.240 For example, in Pierce Ford Sales v. Ford
Motor Co.,24 ' the Second Circuit overturned a jury verdict that
found Ford liable for refusing to approve the plaintiff's attempt
to sell its dealership to various third parties. The court indi-
cated Ford had a right to prevent the sale of the dealership in
light of an express clause requiring Ford's approval. 243 The
court further stated that "even without such a condition Ford
would be justified in protecting its own interest to have a
dealer financially sound." 2 "
One case that diverges from this pattern is Smith v. Ford
Motor Co., in which the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that a manufacturer may be liable for inducing its dealer to ter-
minate a manager who had joined an alliance.2 A5 Professor
Dobbs criticized the opinion in Smith on the ground that "a
business might make the judgment that it was economically
sound to discourage dealer alliances."' ' 6
Similarly, a competing dealer generally may approach a
supplier and seek a dealership, even if it means the supplier
will terminate an existing dealer. Courts often have found that
the competition privilege under section 768 permits this form of
interference provided there is no restraint of trade, the defend-
ant did not use improper means, and the defendant seeks to ad-
dealer's tortious interference claim and overturning antitrust verdict because
plaintiff did not show harm to competition or unreasonable restraint of trade);
Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 221 S.E.2d 282, 296 (N.C. 1976) (holding manufac-
turer may be liable for inducing termination of manager who had joined
dealer's alliance); James 0. Pearson, Annotation, Liability for Interference
with Franchise, 97 A.L.R.3D 890 (1980) (citing cases).
240. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Babson Brothers Co.
v. Allison, 337 So. 2d 848 (Fla. App. 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 944 (Fla.
1977), which held that a parent corporation may interfere with a subsidiary's
contracts with dealers because of its financial interest in the sale of its
products.
241. 299 F.2d 425 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 371 U.S. 829 (1962).
242. IHi at 427.
243. Id. at 429.
244. Id
245. 221 S.E.2d 282, 296 (N.C. 1976).
246. Dobbs, supra note 48, at 338 n.20.
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vance its competitive interest.247 Still, several courts have
refused to recognize this principle on the formalistic ground
that the aspiring dealer tortiously induced the breach of an ex-
isting exclusive contract.248
Finally, several cases have recognized that a manufacturer
may compete with its distributors in downstream markets, in-
cluding undercutting the distributor's price.249 Others, how-
ever, have found potential liability in the same situation.250 To
some extent, the outcome in these cases should depend on the
terms of the contract between the manufacturer and the dis-
tributor251-a manufacturer should be liable under the contract
if it has violated an express provision against competing down-
stream. Assuming no express understanding, however, the
competition principle should permit a manufacturer to compete
downstream, provided it does not employ predatory or price-
discriminatory means. The effect of allowing manufacturer au-
tonomy should be to increase, not decrease, competition.
Federal antitrust policy clearly affirms manufacturers'
freedom to establish, regulate, and terminate dealerships. Ex-
cept for a few specific statutory exceptions, such as the Petro-
leum Marketing Practices Act,252 manufacturers face only
limited federal scrutiny in this important arena. The antitrust
laws permit suppliers to cease doing business with a dealer and
to form agreements with new parties to replace the terminated
dealer, so long as their actions are undertaken indepen-
dently.253 As the Supreme Court observed in Continental T V.
247. Continental Research v. Cruttenden, Podesta & Miller, 222 F. Supp.
190, 218-19 (D. Minn. 1963); Tokuzo Shida v. Japan Food Corp., 60 Cal. Rptr.
43, 44-45 (Ct. App. 1967). See generally Pearson, supra note 239 (analyzing
cases involving interference with vertical relationships).
248. E.g., Maison Lazard et Compagnie v. Manfra, Tordella & Brooks, Inc.,
585 F. Supp. 1286, 1290-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Revlon, Inc. v. Crest Distribs., 190
N.Y.S.2d 745, 747 (1959).
249. Conoco, Inc. v. Inman Oil Co., 774 F.2d 895, 907 (8th Cir. 1985);
Oreman Sales v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 768 F. Supp. 1174, 1183-84 (E.D. La.
1991); Circo v. Spanish Gardens Food Mfg. Co., 643 F. Supp. 51, 55-56 (W.D.
Mo. 1985).
250. E.g., Bergstein v. Jordache Enters., 767 F. Supp. 535, 543-44 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (holding a manufacturer may be liable under New York law for dealing
directly with a customer and thus depriving the broker of a commission).
251. E.g., Oreman Sales, 768 F. Supp. at 1184 (contract allowed manufac-
turer to compete directly with distributor).
252. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-41 (1988). The other example is the Automobile
Dealers' Franchise Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1988).
253. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760-61 (1984);
Northwest Power Prods. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83, 85-86 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); see also DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington
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v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,2-5 the "primary concern of antitrust law"
is interbrand competition, which is not harmed and may actu-
ally be enhanced by vertical dealer agreements.255 The Court
explained that "[v]ertical restrictions promote interbrand com-
petition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain effi-
ciencies in the distribution of his products.... [Manufacturers
have an economic interest in maintaining as much intrabrand
competition as is consistent with the efficient distribution of
their products. '256 Similarly, although a few states have statu-
tory guidelines regulating dealer relationships,257 the principle
of laissez faire is the predominant rule.
Tortious interference law, as it exists in many states, is
thus a poor vehicle for governing manufacturer-dealer relation-
ships. One commentator, Harvey Perlman, explained that anti-
trust rules have been developed to resolve questions that arise
in this context.2ss Given that many vertical agreements lead to
efficient and pro-competitive results, tortious interference law
should play a limited role in restricting a manufacturer's ability
to structure intrabrand competition in the market. Courts
should limit the role of tort law in governing dealer relation-
ships to third-party liability for interference with existing
dealer contracts of definite duration and to liability for inde-
pendently tortious acts and restraints of trade.259
Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1505-09 (11th Cir. 1989) (discussing vertical
restraint rules), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990); Dunnivant v. Bi-State Auto
Parts, 851 F.2d 1575, 1580-81 (11th Cir. 1988) (same).
254. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
255. Id. at 52 n.19. The Court noted, however, that the potential reduction
of intrabrand competition renders complex the market impact of vertical re-
strictions. Id- at 51-52. For a case applying GTE Sylvania's analysis, see
Machine Maintenance & Equipment Co. v. Cooper Industries, 661 F. Supp.
1112, 1118-19 (E.D. Mo. 1987), which overturned a dealer's antitrust verdict be-
cause the dealer did not show any harm to competition or unreasonable re-
straint of trade.
256. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51-56. Eleven years later, the Court in
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988), held
that vertical dealer agreements are not illegal per se unless there is an agree-
ment on price or price levels. Id at 735-36. If no price agreement were re-
quired, the Court reasoned, a jury would have to evaluate a manufacturer's
motive. Id at 727-28. The ultimate effect could be to chill legitimate competi-
tive conduct with the threat of treble damages and criminal penalties. Id
Under tortious interference law as it exists in many jurisdictions, however, the
jury would be invited to make just such an inquiry.
257. See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 48, at 368-69 n.133 (citing examples from
Arizona and New Jersey).
258. Perlman, supra note 46, at 108-09.
259. See id. (suggesting limitation of tort liability to wrongful acts).
1993] 1147
AMINNESOTA LAW REVIEW[
D. PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS AND OTHER GROUP
BEHAVIOR
Group behavior presents related, but slightly different, is-
sues. When a self-regulatory organization, such as a profes-
sional association, takes actions to regulate its membership or
to exclude a party for non-compliance with governing rules, the
adversely affected party often seeks legal recourse. For in-
stance, a doctor denied hospital staff privileges often will sue
under various antitrust and state tort theories.260
To the extent that these claims allege a violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must show either a per se
violation, such as certain group boycotts, 261 or that the defend-
ants have unreasonably restrained competition.262 To show an
unreasonable restraint of trade, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendants reduced output, raised prices, or otherwise
had a detrimental effect on the relevant product and geo-
graphic market.263 Courts recognize that a showing that the as-
sociation's actions caused the plaintiff injury does not suffice;
the plaintiff also must show injury to competition. For exam-
ple, in Les Shockley Racing v. National Hot Rod Ass'n,264 the
260. See, e.g., Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, 376 P.2d 568,
569-70 (Cal. 1962) (en banc) (osteopath sued hospital for restraint of trade and
tortious interference for its refusal to grant staff privileges and for impugning
his reputation).
261. A group boycott is per se unlawful if the defendants have substantial
market power or control of an essential facility. Northwest Wholesale Station-
ers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296 (1985); see Reazin v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 663 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Kan. 1987) (finding group boy-
cott and tortious interference), aff'd in par rev'd in part, 899 F.2d 951 (10th
Cir.), cert denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990).
262. Section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination .... or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or among foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The Supreme
Court has interpreted this section to prohibit only those contracts, combina-
tions, and conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade. See United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179-80 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911).
263. See, e.g., Les Shockley Racing v. National Hot Rod Ass'n, 884 F.2d 504,
508 (9th Cir. 1989); see also International Travel Arrangers v. NWA, Inc., 723
F. Supp. 141, 143-45, 155 (D. Minn. 1989) (denying motion for summary judg-
ment where plaintiff alleged violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and tortious
interference with prospective business relations); Reazin, 663 F. Supp. at 1396
(finding unreasonable restraint of trade based on evidence of market power,
horizontal conspiracy, and reduction in competition); Grillo v. Board of Real-
tors, 219 A.2d 635, 641-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1966) (finding that realtor
organization's refusal to allow non-members to use multiple listing service is
both restraint of trade and tortious interference).
264. 884 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1989).
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plaintiffs, owners and operators of jet-powered trucks and
motorcycles, alleged that the National Hot Rod Association and
other defendants had excluded them from drag racing events,
in violation of the Sherman Act and state tort law.265 The
court held that the antitrust claim should fail because the
plaintiffs did not allege any injury to competition.266
Tortious interference claims do not focus on the injury to
competition issue. Rather, the question again is whether the
defendant has a "justification" for interference. 26 7 One exam-
ple of such a tort rule is in Willis v. Santa Ana Community
Hospital Ass'n,2 68 where an osteopath sued a hospital for re-
straint of trade and tortious interference because of its refusal
to grant staff privileges and for impugning his reputation to
other local hospitals. The court applied the common law rule
that the plaintiff can recover if the defendant interfered with
his livelihood "by unlawful means or by means otherwise law-
ful when there is a lack of sufficient justification. '2 69 The justi-
fication issue, the court stated, is determined through a
balancing of society's and the parties' interests in protecting the
activities interfered with and in permitting the interference.
2 70
In these settings, as in those earlier discussed, tortious in-
terference law would be more precise and could promote effi-
ciency if it were confined to cases of interference with existing
contracts and to cases involving wrongful acts, such as in-
dependent torts or restraints of trade.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust law and the law of tortious interference play sig-
nificant roles in the regulation of marketplace behavior. Both
areas of law define the "rules of the game," that is, the bounda-
ries between lawful and impermissible competition. Both seek
to promote desirable economic arrangements while deterring
behavior that undermines the operation of efficient markets.
265. Id at 508.
266. Id at 506-09. The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' pen-
dent state law claims in light of the dismissal of the only federal claim in the
case. I&i at 509.
267. See, e.g., Grillo, 219 A.2d at 649 (discussing standard of fair dealing).
For an analysis of refusals to deal as bases for tort claims, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTs § 766 cmts. 1, q, § 767 cmt. c, § 768 cmts. e, f (1977) and
KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 130, at 1023-26.
268. 376 P.2d 568, 569-70 (Cal. 1962) (en banc).
269. I& at 570.
270. I&
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Plaintiffs often include both types of claims in litigation with
competitors.
Antitrust doctrine, particularly as the Supreme Court has
developed it in the last twenty years, generally furthers free
competition and economic efficiency for the ultimate benefit of
consumers. Accordingly, antitrust law has focused on the ob-
jective economic effect of the challenged restraint on the mar-
ket. Practices that harm competition, based on demonstrable
experience and economic analysis, are presumptively unlawful
under the per se rule. The courts analyze practices that have
more uncertain economic effect under the more relaxed stan-
dards of the rule of reason, with its focus on whether the re-
straint promotes or inhibits competition.
Business tort law, however, has not consistently developed
in accordance with the competition principle. Although "'[the
policy of the common law has always been in favor of free com-
petition,' "271 tortious interference law has developed haphaz-
ardly. Some decisions display insufficient concern for
competition, efficiency, or the interests of consumers. There-
fore, several aspects of tortious interference law, as interpreted
in most jurisdictions, should be modified to permit more vigor-
ous competition.
Tortious interference law reserves its strongest protection
for cases involving interference with existing, valid contracts.
The nearly unanimous view is that third parties do not have a
right, absent a privilege, to undermine the stability of these
economic arrangements. Like the protection given these agree-
ments under contract law, tort protection for existing contracts
is economically defensible. The only economic objection con-
cerns the availability of punitive damages, which may deter ef-
ficient breaches of contract. This aspect of tortious
interference law consequently requires, at most, limitation of
remedies to actual damages, except in cases involving indepen-
dently tortious actions.
The treatment of at-will and voidable contracts in tortious
interference' law is less certain. Some states give these agree-
ments the same or nearly the same degree of protection as valid
contracts of definite duration, while other states recognize that
at-will and voidable contracts deserve less insulation from the
influence of third parties. The competition principle developed
in this Article suggests that third parties should be free to in-
271. Warde v. Kaiser, 887 F.2d 97, 101 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting KEETON ET
AL., supra note 48, § 130, at 1012).
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terfere with these tenuous economic relationships. At-will and
voidable contracts accordingly should be treated under the com-
petition analysis applied to prospective business relationships,
allowing greater scope for third-party interference.
Tort law governing prospective business relationships re-
quires less severe modification because courts almost univer-
sally recognize that competitors have a right to compete for
future business. Nonetheless, two problems remain. First,
under section 768 of the Restatement and the law of most juris-
dictions, a competitor still may be liable for interference if a de-
sire to harm the plaintiff motivated its actions. This loophole
permits extensive litigation over a firm's subjective motive for
its actions in the marketplace, which in turn presents opportu-
nities for legal error and potentially chills vigorous competition
on the merits. For reasons of efficiency and sound judicial ad-
ministration, the "purpose" prong of section 768 should be
eliminated.
Second, the Restatement leaves unresolved the issue of
which party has the burden of proof on the question of whether
a firm's interference with a competitor's business prospects was
improper. Indeed, many courts view competition as a "privi-
lege" and require the defendant to prove that it is entitled to
receive protection for its actions. In cases in which the alleged
interference arises from the behavior of a bona fide competitor,
the plaintiff should have the burden of proving that the inter-
ference was improper. If the plaintiff can prove that the de-
fendant engaged in some unlawful act, including a violation of
the antitrust laws,272 then the plaintiff has established this ele-
ment of its tortious interference claim. In this manner, tortious
interference law would provide greater latitude for competition
on the merits and strike the proper balance between competi-
tion and the promotion of stable economic relationships.
Finally, if the "purpose" analysis under section 768 is re-
tained, then the plaintiff should at least -have the burden of
showing that subjective element. If the plaintiff, after a suita-
ble opportunity for discovery when appropriate, 273 cannot come
forward with evidence of the defendant's bad faith, then the
tortious interference claim should fail as a matter of law.
272. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. c, at 31 (1977); see, e.g.,
International Travel Arrangers v. NWA, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 141, 143-45, 155 (D.
Minn. 1989) (plaintiff's claims included violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act
and tortious interference with prospective business relations).
273. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
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These revisions in tortious interference law would not evis-
cerate that area of tort law. Rather, the changes would resolve
some of the doctrinal tensions already present there while at
the same time reconciling the treatment of behavior that falls
within the bailiwick of both tort and antitrust law.
